Product system implications at end-of-life: An Economic and environmental assessment by Krystofik, Mark
Rochester Institute of Technology
RIT Scholar Works
Theses Thesis/Dissertation Collections
5-1-2013
Product system implications at end-of-life: An
Economic and environmental assessment
Mark Krystofik
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Thesis/Dissertation Collections at RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Krystofik, Mark, "Product system implications at end-of-life: An Economic and environmental assessment" (2013). Thesis. Rochester
Institute of Technology. Accessed from
  
 
PRODUCT SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS AT END-OF-LIFE: 
AN ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
by 
MARK KRYSTOFIK 
 
A DISSERTATION  
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Sustainability 
 
Department of Sustainability 
 
Golisano Institute for Sustainability 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
 
May 2013 
 
Author: _________________________________________________________________ 
Sustainability Program 
Certified by: _____________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Gabrielle G. Gaustad 
Assistant Professor of Sustainability Program 
Approved by: ____________________________________________________________ 
Paul H. Stiebitz 
Associate Academic Director of Sustainability Program 
Certified by: _____________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Nabil Nasr 
Assistant Provost and Director, Golisano Institute for Sustainability and CIMS 
 
    
 
ii 
 
NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT 
 
© 2013 
 
Mark Krystofik 
 
    
 
iii 
 
Product system implications at end-of-life: an economic and 
environmental assessment 
 
By 
 
Mark Krystofik 
 
Submitted by Mark Krystofik in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Sustainability and accepted on behalf of the Rochester Institute of Technology by the 
dissertation committee. 
 
We, the undersigned members of the Faculty of the Rochester Institute of Technology, certify that we have 
advised and/or supervised the candidate on the work described in this dissertation.  We further certify that 
we have reviewed the dissertation manuscript and approve it in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sustainability. 
 
Approved by: 
 
Dr. Gabrielle G. Gaustad       
 (Committee Chair and Dissertation Advisor)               Date 
 
Dr. Callie W. Babbitt       
 
 
Dr. M. Jeffrey Wagner       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM 
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
May 2013 
 
    
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
Golisano Institute for Sustainability 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
 
 
Degree    Doctor of Philosophy    Program        Sustainability     
Name of Candidate Mark Krystofik 
Title Product system implications at end-of-life: an economic and environmental 
assessment  
 
While there are many opportunities to make adjustments in how products are 
produced and consumed to reduce environmental impact, this dissertation focuses on 
product reuse and proposes a framework to evaluate the economic and environmental 
effects of proposed interventions in the product system that encourage end-of-life product 
to be guided toward environmentally preferred reuse or recycling paths.  A novel aspect 
of the approach requires characterizing the product system structure to distinguish 
between those interventions that maintain the interaction dynamics amongst product 
system actors (producers, consumers and government), and those that alter the product 
system structure, enabling unintended consequences.  The consumer printing sector 
serves as the backdrop to demonstrate our framework over three essays.  This sector was 
chosen because inkjet cartridges have a variety of end-of-life paths available in the 
United States, but the majority is still routed to the municipal waste stream after a single 
use. The first essay utilizes Life Cycle Assessment to quantify the environmental impact 
of an inkjet cartridge compared to remanufactured and multiple refilling alternatives.  
Results confirm that inkjet cartridge reuse provides environmental improvement over 
new inkjet cartridges.  However, inclusion of how consumers go about purchasing and 
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disposing of inkjet cartridges in the functional unit revealed changes in consumer 
behavior can have more bearing on environmental impact than what product alternative 
was purchased.  The second essay uses economic modeling to show that it is possible to 
raise social welfare and maintain the original manufacturer’s profit by strengthening the 
firm’s intellectual property rights in exchange for the firm implementing greener physical 
product attributes.  The third essay considers the economic and environmental effects of a 
product take-back regulation that may encourage recycling in a collective implementation 
or remanufacturing of the durable printer in an individual producer implementation.  
While take-back only applies to the printer market, we investigate the spillover effects to 
the cartridge market that resides within our product system model. While a collective 
take-back scheme minimizes environmental harm, welfare is also minimized.  Whereas, 
under an individual take-back scheme, environmentally preferred remanufacturing of 
returned durable products may lead to a reduction in environmental harm while 
increasing welfare.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in sustainable consumption and production aims to promote social and 
economic development within the carrying capacity of ecosystems by a) improving 
efficiency of production processes, b) moving toward sustainable use of resources, and c) 
reducing resource degradation, pollution and waste.  The research in this area is focused 
on eco-efficiency strategies on the production side, encouraging more efficient 
deployment of products and services during the use phase, and reducing consumption 
volumes while maintaining quality of life, promoting end-of-life products toward reuse or 
recycling paths, or switching to greener products on the consumption side [1].  This 
research has provided valuable insight into understanding the role each actor (i.e., 
consumer, producer and government) plays within a product market, and has identified 
factors responsible for attributing to current environmental impacts.   
However, this research field struggles with evaluating the overall effects that 
independent actor intervention recommendations will have in the product market(s) due 
in part to complex interactions that exist between these actors, but also since some 
recommended environmentally motivated interventions typically lead to an altered 
product system structure, which may make findings from previous modeling (based on 
the original product structure) invalid.  This dissertation proposes a system-level analysis 
framework to evaluate economic and environmental implications of recommended actor 
interventions.  For interventions that maintain the product system structure (PSS), the 
framework allows for economic and environmental comparison of pre and post 
intervention conditions.  Whereas for interventions that disrupt the product system 
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structure, our approach suggests revised characterization of the product system structure 
is necessary to identify avenues that can lead to unintended consequences.   
Basic Conditions
Consumer Demand
Elasticity of demand
Substitutes
Seasonality
Rate of growth
Location
Lumpiness of orders
Method of purchase
Production
Technology
Raw materials
Unionization
Product durability
Location
Scale economies
Scope of economies
Structure
Numbers of buyers and sellers
Barriers to entry of new firms
Conduct
Advertising
Research and development
Pricing behavior
Plant investment
Product differentiation
Vertical integration
Diversification
Legal tactics
Product choice
Collusion
Merger and contracts
Performance
Price
Production efficiency
Allocative efficiency
Equity
Product quality
Technical progress
Profits
Government Policy
Regulation
Antitrust
Barriers to entry
Taxes and subsidies
Investment incentives
Employment incentives
Macroeconomic policies
Structure
Conduct
Performance
Approach
Figure 1.1 Structure, conduct and performance approach as presented by Figure 1.1. 
Carlton and Perloff [2]. 
 
Our PSS concept takes a systems approach by first determining the environmental 
impacts for a specific product of interest throughout its lifecycle and identifying 
opportunities for environmental improvement.  Each intervention opportunity can then be 
evaluated to determine if the proposed intervention would alter the ways the individual 
actors interact in the product market(s).  Our PSS concept is much like the structure-
conduct -performance approach (Figure 1.1 adapted from Figure 1.1 Carlton and Perloff 
[2]) commonly used in the field of industrial organization to understand economic 
performance, except we also include environmental performance .  We specifically 
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identify key observations to consider for each of the boxes shown in Figure 1.1 to 
determine the PSS for the product markets studied in this dissertation.  An intervention in 
the form of information the Environmental Protection Agency posts on their web site that 
mentions ways for people to reduce the environmental impact of their lifestyle choices is 
of the type that maintains the product system structure.    An intervention of this type 
enables voluntary actions and does not necessarily change the way producers and 
consumers interact.  However, an intervention in the form of a regulation or policy 
instrument (e.g., tax on a “brown” good and/or subsidy on a “green” good) alters the free 
market playing field and rules of engagement.  This altered product system structure may 
prompt responses from firms and/or consumers that could not be anticipated in the 
original product structured before the regulation.  If we think of a product system 
structure as a card game with defined rules, and card players have knowledge of different 
strategies available to play the game, then the regulation would be like a new rule 
introduced to the game.  The new rule changes the card game, and an effective strategy 
under the old rules may become completely ineffective in the new game. 
Rapid technological progress in electronic products (e.g., cellular phones, 
personal computers, printers and multifunction devices) has provided society with many 
benefits, such as enhanced productivity, communication and information processing.  
However, consumer desire for faster and better devices, results in new production and 
premature abandonment of functional, but outdated electronic products.  Gains in 
production output efficiency have been accompanied with side-effects in the form of 
negative environmental externalities, such as eutrophication from fertilizer use and 
livestock production, ozone depletion from halocarbon refrigerants, pollution and GHG 
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emissions from all sectors of the economy that disrupt ecological recycling and threaten 
the Earth’s life support functions.  But unlike natural systems where residues are 
welcome additions to interconnected food webs, discarded products are often not returned 
to industrial systems as efficiently as residues are returned to natural systems.  Since 
industrial systems are not interconnected as in natural systems, discarded products may 
be routed to a variety of end-of-life paths, such as reuse, repair, refurbishment, 
remanufacture, recycling, incineration, and landfill.  From a systems level approach, 
slowing overall consumption of material and energy intensive products combined with 
efficient processing of discarded products back into the production of new products that 
better fit changing needs of our evolving society is in alignment with sustainable 
development.    
This dissertation looks to fill a gap in the literature by combining a variety of 
analysis tools, including economic welfare modeling, life cycle assessment (LCA), and 
systematic operational analysis to ascertain the economic and environmental impacts of 
actor intervention opportunities, with specific focus upon actor engagements defined by 
the product system structure.  Our case study focused on the inkjet cartridge market.  
Inkjet cartridges were considered because the majority (65% to 75%) is routed to disposal 
after a single use in North America [3], even though there are a variety of end-of-life 
routes that could provide environmental benefits.  But due to a tie-in sales strategy 
prevalent in the inkjet printer/cartridge markets, both product markets were considered 
using our PSS framework.  Chapter 2 uses embodied energy as a proxy for environmental 
impact in comparing new, remanufactured and refilled inkjet cartridges, and maps 
environmental impact of discard paths.  As expected, reuse alternatives can provide 
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environmental improvement in the product market, and informing consumers of these 
findings may encourage some consumers to alter their purchase choices and discard 
methods.  More importantly, the analysis revealed that consumers could drive much more 
environmental improvement by changing the manner cartridges (or alternatives) were 
purchased (e.g., reduce consumer travel to a retail store) rather than altering their 
cartridge purchasing decisions.   Maintaining the mix and volume of cartridge and 
alternatives consumed in the market should not prompt a response from producers, as 
would be expected if consumers dramatically substituted reused cartridge alternatives for 
new cartridges.  Hence, sharing these findings from the LCA study to the general public 
would be an intervention that maintains the product system structure.  
Investigation into the reasons for cartridges to be routed toward less 
environmentally preferred end-of-life routes, revealed an important connection to the 
printer market.  Original manufacturers (OMs) use a tie-in strategy, where printers are 
offered on the market at a low price to increase demand for highly profitable replacement 
cartridges.  Under this strategy, the OM is motivated to sell single use cartridges, and 
actively takes step to prevent independent firms from providing high quality 
remanufactured cartridges that would reduce the number of new replacement ink 
cartridges sold by the OM.  The OM utilizes a combination of intellectual property rights 
and physical product attributes incorporated into the design in order to deter independent 
firms from remanufacturing the original manufacturer’s product.  The contribution of 
Chapter 3 is to combine the economics of green design literature with the literatures 
regarding raising rivals’ costs and the economics of intellectual property rights to show 
that a regulator could raise social welfare by strengthening the OMs’ intellectual property 
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rights in exchange for an increase in remanufacturability built into products by OMs.  
While motivated by observations seen in the printer-cartridge markets, the analysis 
performed in Chapter 3 is general and broadly applicable. The basic idea is that an OM 
can protect profit from independent (aftermarket) manufacturers by either reducing the 
remanufacturability of its product or by enjoying relatively strong intellectual property 
rights.  These strategies can differ in social impact, however, as reducing 
remanufacturability raises consumption of single-use products and therefore increases the 
flow of virgin materials to production and the flow of consumer waste to landfills.  As 
opposed to recommending government install a new policy to influence OMs to increase 
remanufacturability of their products that would change the structure of the product 
system, this chapter looks at the economic and environmental impacts of selectively fine 
tuning an existing government policy mechanism, the intellectual property right system. 
Given that our product system structure for our case study encompasses both the inkjet 
printer market and replacement inkjet cartridge markets, Chapter 4 investigates economic 
and environmental impacts across both markets for a product take-back regulation for the 
durable printer, much like the WEEE Directive in Europe.  Our findings that the 
economic and environmental impacts are dependent on whether the durable product take-
back is implemented as a collective or individual producer responsibility scheme is 
consistent with the literature [4-6].  One novelty of our approach is that these impacts are 
examined across both the durable and consumables markets as defined by our product 
system structure.  We find that environmental damage is reduced under collective durable 
product take-back, but welfare is lower than prior to the take-back requirement, and 
lower than when the firm remanufactures under the individual durable product take-back 
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scheme.  The economic and environmental impacts under the individual scheme are 
dependent upon the cost savings the firm can achieve from reusing returned durable 
product, and the environmental benefit achieved from reuse.  On a per durable product 
basis, individual take-back with the OM remanufacturing can range from a little worse to 
much better than the collective scheme from an environmental damage perspective.  We 
find social welfare is improved the most under individual take-back with the OM 
remanufacturing, but the results depend upon the environmental savings that can be 
achieved from remanufacturing. 
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II. WHEN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR DICTATES LIFE-CYCLE 
PERFORMANCE BEYOND THE USES PHASE: CASE STUDY OF INKJET 
CARTRIDGE END-OF-LIFE MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
 Public awareness of environmental issues has left consumers wondering what 
lifestyle changes they can initiate to lessen the environmental impacts associated with 
consumption.  Aside from just consuming less, consumers may reduce their 
environmental footprint by switching to product alternatives with lower life cycle 
environmental impacts.  Markets have responded with “greener” product offerings; but 
higher prices and performance concerns discourage wide-spread adoption.  One example 
is remanufactured products, which have the stigma of being a “used” product, but are 
considered to be greener, since some remanufactured products require less energy and 
virgin materials than their new counterparts [7, 8]. Additionally, the lower price of 
remanufactured products may make them desirable to consumers.  A remanufactured 
product is more likely to be a suitable replacement when the consumer values cost and 
function over other product attributes, like aesthetics.  An example of this preference is 
consumer printer cartridges, which can be refilled for reuse or remanufactured for direct 
savings to the consumer without significant loss of quality or need to maintain 
appearance.  However, remanufactured and refilled printer cartridges satisfy just 20% of 
market demand in the United States [9].  This low percentage can be attributed to market 
dynamics and a lack of clear guidance for consumers.  Since printer original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs or OMs) use a business model that relies on sales of new inkjet 
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cartridges, OEMs are motivated to protect their revenue stream by discouraging cartridge 
reuse alternatives provided by independent remanufacturing and refilling firms. 
 The disparity between new and reused or remanufactured cartridges will likely 
grow as the market expands.  In 2006,  479 million new inkjet cartridges, 85% of the total 
cartridge market were shipped to North America [3].  The inkjet printer market is 
projected to see 5.8% compound annual growth in the United States through 2014 [10].  
Increasingly, inkjet printers are preferred over laser printer alternatives, due to 
performance and cost.  Printed page yield for a laser printer cartridge have ranges of the 
order of 1,000 to 50,000 pages (at 5% coverage), whereas the range for an inkjet cartridge 
is typically from 100 to 2,000 pages.  The technologies also diverge in price, resulting in 
a market segmented between high volume users selecting laser printing technology and 
home and small business users selecting inkjet technology.  Due to cartridge construction 
differences laser cartridges must have internal components replaced during a 
remanufacturing cycle to provide acceptable performance, whereas an inkjet cartridge 
may be refilled multiple times before degradation in printing is noticeable [11]. This 
inherent durability of inkjet cartridges and the associated profit potential of refilling have 
prompted inkjet cartridge refilling services to enter the retail landscape, including 
national retailers Wal-Mart and Walgreens.   
 While laser and inkjet cartridges provide a similar function in a printing system, 
their similarities end there, preventing previous laser cartridge LCA research from 
painting a clear picture of the environmental impacts associated with end-of-life paths 
and reuse options for inkjet cartridges that were not considered in a 1996 inkjet cartridge 
LCA [12].  Results for these studies are summarized in Table 2.1, with an expanded 
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description of each study in the Appendix.  This body of work has revealed several 
findings that are relevant for the inkjet cartridge case. In 2002, Berglind and Eriksson 
demonstrated environmental savings could be achieved from multiple laser cartridge 
remanufacturing cycles, while bringing attention to the impact of paper and printer 
electricity, noting that 95% of the electricity consumed by the printer during the cartridge 
use cycle occurred while the printer was idle [13].   A 2004 study conducted by First 
Environment proposed a methodology for dealing with quality and page yield difference 
between a new Hewlett-Packard (HP) laser cartridge and three very different 
remanufactured versions in the marketplace at that time [14]. This study was also 
refreshed  in 2008 by Four Elements Consulting , but included a detailed sensitivity 
analysis [15].  This literature does not address the scenario of multiple use cycles that 
may be achieved from refilling one original inkjet cartridge.  No study to our knowledge 
connects this consumer-driven EOL pathway to potential environmental benefits. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of LCA parameters and key results for previous cartridge assessments 
 
Study 
1996 HP 
Inkjet 
2002 HP C4127X (laser) 2004 HP C4096A (laser) 2008 HP Q2610A (laser) 
Cartridge OEM OEM Rem OEM Rem OEM Rem-Base Rem-Drill & Fill Rem-Int’l Oper. OEM Rem- Base 
Paper No No No 
10,000 
pp 
10,000 
pp 
100 usable pp 100 usable pp 
GWP100 % kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq kg CO2 eq 
Production 85% 
9.533 5.867 31.033 27.367 
0.239 42% 0.103 20% 0.059 11% 0.252 36% 0.096 12% 0.095 4% 
Distribution 13% 0.031 5% 0.019 4% 0.002 0% 0.032 5% 0.008 1% 0 0% 
Use 0% 0.415 73% 0.438 85% 0.483 90% 0.422 60% 0.72 90% 0.835 96% 
EOL 2% -0.116 -20% -0.042 -8% -0.009 -2% -0.008 -1% -0.024 -3% 0 0% 
Total 100% 9.533 5.867 31.033 27.367 0.569 100% 0.518 100% 0.535 100% 0.698 100% 0.8 100% 0.870 100% 
Recycle None Some Metals OPC Drum None 59% None 
Waste-to-
Energy 
Yes Yes Balance 86% 90% 90% 
Landfill Yes Yes No 14% 10% 10% 
Note: “OEM” refers to a new cartridge and “Rem” refers to a remanufactured cartridge.  The three remanufactured cartridge scenarios considered in the 2004 
study were 1) a baseline remanufacturing cycle assumed to be representative of the remanufacturing industry in North America denoted as Rem-Base, 2) a “drill 
and fill” operation where an empty OEM cartridge is just drilled in order to remove residual and waste toner in the cartridge and then filled with replacement 
toner, and 3) a remanufactured cartridge produced by an international remanufacturer with improved quality and reliability than the baseline version. 
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 The purpose of this study is to provide a consumer-oriented comparison of the 
environmental tradeoffs associated with retail refilling and remanufactured inkjet 
cartridge alternatives as compared to purchasing new OEM inkjet cartridges.  Since a 
consumer’s inkjet cartridge purchase options at any point in time are dependent upon 
actions taken in previous time periods, our study specifically focuses on:  1) consumer 
decisions at cartridge end-of-life (EOL), 2) the processing an EOL inkjet cartridge 
undergoes before returning to the market as a reused (e.g., remanufactured or refilled) 
alternative, and 3) how consumers purchase inkjet cartridges.  Sensitivity and scenario 
analyses are used to explore assumptions and parameter uncertainties while incorporating 
observations and data from the inkjet cartridge market to describe the inkjet cartridge 
alternatives typically found in the U.S. market.  Previous LCA results in the print 
industry suggest consumer behavior during the use phase as the best opportunity for 
environmental savings from the reduction of paper consumption  [16].  Our study fills a 
gap in existing literature by investigating consumer behavior pertaining to the mode of 
transportation and manner in which consumers purchase cartridges (i.e., multiple 
cartridge purchases vs. one-by-one purchasing).  Understanding conditions where 
cartridge reuse can provide environmental savings without sacrificing benefit consumers 
receive from printed output is explored in this study. 
 
2.2 Inkjet cartridge LCA 
2.2.1 Methodology and framework 
This LCA study was conducted with guidance from the International Organization 
for Standardization’s (ISO’s) 14040 and 14044 standards[17] .   The LCA was applied to 
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a monochrome (i.e., black ink) inkjet cartridge produced by Hewlett-Packard, the leader 
in the consumer inkjet printing market, and was chosen for several reasons: 
1. The HP 60 inkjet cartridge was designed so that it could utilize plastic recycled 
from previously used HP inkjet cartridges; an innovative process widely promoted 
by Hewlett-Packard [18].   
2. Unlike previous generation inkjet cartridges that specify the amount of ink in the 
cartridge, the HP 60 cartridge instead identifies an expected page yield of up to 
200 one-sided pages at 5% ink coverage. 
3. The HP 60 cartridge is representative of a recent trend in the industry of providing 
the consumer two replacement inkjet cartridge options, HP 60 and HP 60XL.  The 
HP 60XL is a high yield version cartridge with up to 600 one-sided pages of 
expected output.  The HP 60 has a lower price than the HP 60XL, but a higher 
price per page printed as seen in Table 2.2. 
 Table 2.2 Cartridge prices from Staples ®.com on August 3, 2012 
Model Yield Price Price per Printed Page 
HP 60 Up to 200 pp $14.99 $0.075 
HP 60XL Up to 600 pp $34.99 $0.058 
 
 
2.2.2 Goal and scope 
 The main goal of the study is evaluate environmental impacts of EOL pathways 
available to consumers for an inkjet cartridge and determine to what extent the consumer 
behaviors influence these impacts.  Results from this LCA are intended to be used to 
inform and guide consumers in comparing EOL pathways and inkjet cartridge reuse 
alternatives.  To achieve this goal, specific objectives of the study were to: 
1. Determine the life cycle inventory for a representative inkjet cartridge. 
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2. Compare the life cycle impact of this representative inkjet cartridge with related 
alternatives available to a US consumer, namely, cartridge refilling performed by 
a retailer, and purchasing a remanufactured cartridge at a retailer.  This 
comparison will also identify environmental “hotspots” associated with how 
consumers achieve printed output by the inkjet cartridge options they choose, 
including the transport mode and manner in which cartridges are purchased.  Each 
scenario includes sensitivity analysis on parameters with high uncertainty to 
identify conditions under which the environmental preference of inkjet cartridge 
options may change. 
3. Compare the environmental impact of alternative potential waste management 
options (i.e., recycle, donation and disposal) for each cartridge option at the end 
of the use stage.  
2.2.3 Functional unit   
 The function of an inkjet cartridge is to enable a user to print output, and it is only 
one part of a printing system, which includes a printer, print media, a computer or other 
device used to transmit the data to be printed.  Although there may be differences 
between the quality and quantity of pages printed across each cartridge alternative, the 
baseline assumption was that the quality and quantity of pages printed would be identical 
for each cartridge alternative.  Although previous comparative life cycle assessment 
studies listed in Table 2.1 for printer cartridges typically use “pages printed” or a 
variation thereof for the functional unit, basing results on cartridge use cycles allows for 
more direct focus on impacts specific to the inkjet cartridge EOL route chosen by the 
consumer, regardless of use.  Previous studies, which all assume 100 pages of printed 
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output, also introduce a metric of “usability” for the printed output, and their results show 
that perceived quality differences in printed output can have a substantial influence on the 
life cycle impact.  To be conservative, our study assumes that each inkjet cartridge 
alternative provides sufficient quality so that all 100 pages of printed output are usable.  
This assumption reflects the market, where reputable remanufacturers and retailers 
offering refill services offer a money back guarantee [19, 20].  Since multiple reuse 
cycles achieved from refilling by a retailer was of specific interest, the functional unit 
was defined as “five use cycles.” This functional unit enables comparison of five new 
cartridges, one new cartridge reused four subsequent times, or any combination that 
provides functionality of five cartridge uses. 
2.2.4 Processes and assumptions 
 Figure 1 shows the processes included for the comparative life cycle assessment 
of five inkjet cartridge use cycles when a consumer has the choice of purchasing a new or 
remanufactured cartridge upon their first visit to the retail store.  After a use cycle, only a 
new (or previously refilled) inkjet cartridge may be routed for refilling up to a maximum 
of four times.  Every EOL pathway, except disposing of an empty inkjet cartridge into the 
municipal waste stream (MSW), requires the consumer to undertake a transportation 
activity.  For consistency, each consumer transport activity is held constant across 
compared scenarios.  After an inkjet cartridge use cycle, the consumer chooses an EOL 
route for the spent cartridge, independent of the choice for which inkjet cartridge 
alternative to purchase, except for when the consumer chooses the “Refill” EOL route.   
Assumptions and specific details for blocks shown in Figure 2.1 are as follows:  
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OEM Cartridge
Barge Transport 
Truck Transport
Retailer Shelf
Purchase Choice
Customer Transport
Use
MSW Customer Transport
Refill
Recycling
Recycling 
Collector
Remanufacturing
Collector
Refill 
Service
Customer
Transport
Transport
Remanufacturing
Transport
 
Figure 2.1 Processes considered for inkjet cartridge LCA identifying EOL and reuse 
routes. 
 
OEM Cartridge  
 To generate a baseline for comparing cartridge EOL alternatives, a new HP 60 
inkjet cartridge was disassembled and then modeled using life cycle inventory data 
available in the ecoinvent v2.2 database [21] in SimaPro 7.3 [22].  Since the exact origin 
of each component/material could not be verified, European data electricity was assumed 
and no additional transportation operations were added to account for each 
component/material to travel from its manufacturing origin to the final cartridge 
assembly location.  The disassembled inkjet cartridge was categorized into the following 
seven subassemblies/named components: 
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 Housing - The inkjet cartridge housing is composed of 85% polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET) and 15% glass fiber formed into two pieces (ink well and 
top cover) through injection molding.  The ink well is the primary structure 
used in additional processing steps to mount components and sub-assemblies 
in producing a finished inkjet cartridge.  The top cover is used near the end of 
the production process to seal the ink within the cartridge.  The entire 
subassembly weight was used for injection molding processing. 
 Circuitry – the inkjet circuitry is made of a network of conductors that connect to 
the print head and interface to circuitry residing in the printer.  This circuitry 
is similar to a ribbon cable that may be found to connect a monitor to the 
motherboard of a laptop computer, with connections similar to those found in 
integrated circuits where the cable connects to the print head.  The circuitry 
was estimated to contain copper, gold, ethylvinylacetate foil, integrated circuit 
and ribbon cable, all materials available in the ecoinvent database.  Processing 
was estimated using production efforts for transistor manufacturing.  
 Label – A printed label is applied with adhesive to the inkjet cartridge in one of 
the final production steps.  A LDPE film material, adhesive and printing 
operation that best represented the OEM label from the inkjet cartridge under 
study was selected from the ecoinvent database.  Printing of the label was 
estimated using “production of carton board boxes, offset printing” in the 
ecoinvent database. 
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 Polyurethane foam – a block of polyurethane foam is used inside the inkjet 
cartridge housing for the ink delivery system; the cartridge was weighed post 
use, so some portion of dried ink contained in the foam increased its weight.   
 Print head – The thermal inkjet print head integrated into the inkjet cartridge is a 
sophisticated device that enables ink to move from the holding tank onto print 
media.  Over time, the print head has evolved to contain the passive thermal 
inkjet heater circuitry with simple metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) 
transistor drive circuitry incorporated on the same substrate similar to an 
integrated circuit [23].   Due to proprietary nature of the print head design and 
manufacture, we chose to represent the print head as an integrated circuit from 
the ecoinvent database as a reasonable proxy.   
  Ink – the ink found in OEM inkjet cartridges is formulated to work in unison 
with the printer, paper and specific cartridge design to provide optimal 
printing performance.  OEM ink formulations are proprietary, highly 
protected trade secrets.  However, a comparable ink formulation was used in 
this study [24, 25]; primarily consisting of deionized water, followed by the 
addition of various solvents and carbon black for color. 
 Packaging – The packaging represented in this study is reflective of Hewlett-
Packard packaging which included 1) a postage-paid return and recycling 
envelope (which was discontinued in 2008)  so that the consumer could send 
their empty inkjet cartridge to the OEM’s designated recycling center, 2) a 
low density polyethylene (LDPE)/foil wrapper around the cartridge, 3) an 
instruction sheet, 4) a printed paper board box to display the product, 5) and a 
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representative portion of the corrugated case packaging was allocated to an 
individual cartridge.  Processing steps for packaging was assumed to be 
represented in the inkjet assembly processing.  Since packaging represents a 
significant portion (47%) of the total weight of a new packaged inkjet 
cartridge, manufacturers continue to refine inkjet cartridge packaging.  
 
 Manufacturing processing required to produce an inkjet cartridge involve a wide 
range of activities from plastic injection molding, electronic manufacturing and highly 
accurate robotic assembly.  This wide variety made it difficult to select a reasonable 
proxy available in ecoinvent.  Inkjet cartridge manufacturing was estimated using a steel 
processing block in ecoinvent by substituting PET for steel.  Since steel production 
involves processes similar to injection molding and utilizes a similar amount of 
automation, this choice seemed reasonable.     
Barge and Truck transport 
 An inkjet cartridge may be produced at any one of four Hewlett-Packard inkjet 
cartridge manufacturing locations (Singapore, Malaysia, Puerto Rico and Ireland). Each 
location was equally weighted in calculating transport distances for a cartridge to be 
shipped to Rochester, NY USA.  It was assumed that cartridges produced in Singapore 
and Malaysia were shipped via ocean freighters to a port in Los Angeles and then 
transported via large truck to Rochester, and cartridges produced in Puerto Rico and 
Ireland were shipped via ocean freighters to a port in New York City and then transported 
via large truck to Rochester. 
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Retailer shelf 
Since the focus of the study is aimed to inform consumers, the infrastructure and 
operation of a retailer offering OEM and remanufactured inkjet cartridges for sale was 
not included in the study. 
Purchase decision 
This block represents the consumer’s decision process for determining which 
inkjet cartridge alternative to purchase, and does not consist of any actions that contribute 
to environmental impact in itself.  But the manner in which a consumer purchases 
cartridges may have a profound effect upon environmental impact.   In our study, five 
cartridge use cycles could be achieved in many ways, such as by a consumer purchasing 
five OEM inkjet cartridges in one trip to a retailer, or purchasing an OEM cartridge in the 
first trip to a retailer, followed by four subsequent trips to get the empty OEM cartridge 
refilled.  Our base case assumes consumers purchase cartridges one at a time.  Purchasing 
multiple cartridges at one time and varying combinations of cartridges and alternatives 
are considered in sensitivity analysis.  
Consumer transport 
 The base case assumes that the consumer travels 4 kilometers to a retailer to either 
purchase a new or remanufactured cartridge, or to have their existing cartridge refilled, an 
assumption based on a LCA that investigated retail DVD rental locations in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan USA [26].  The base case assumes the consumer uses an automobile to make a 
dedicated visit to a retailer to purchase a single cartridge or refill a cartridge.   The 
consumer purchase decision will affect the number of consumer transports required to 
achieve the functional unit.  But the mode of travel selected by the consumer and the 
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degree to which transport impacts are allocated to the cartridge will also affect 
environmental impact and are considered in sensitivity analysis. 
Use 
Since our study explores EOL routes and reuse options for inkjet cartridges, the 
base case scenario excludes use phase impacts which have been adequately addressed by 
previous laser cartridge LCA studies summarized in Table 2.1 and expanded in the 
Appendix.  However, in order to compare our findings with these previous printer 
cartridge LCA studies, we have also considered a scenario that includes use phase 
impacts.  For this scenario, use phase includes 100 pages (8.5” x 11” size) of output at 
5% ink coverage using uncoated 20 lb. copy paper and electricity required for printing. 
The representative printer (Hewlett-Packard Deskjet F-4280) consumes 17 watts when 
printing, and we estimated 4 minutes were required to print 100 pages. The US Waste 
scenario in the ecoinvent database was selected as the waste treatment option.   
Retail inkjet cartridge refill 
 Though there are several avenues to refill an inkjet cartridge, such as home 
refilling and cartridge exchange services, this study is focused on retail refilling since it is 
a rapidly growing service with widespread availability in the United States [27, 28]. 
Unlike a cartridge exchange service where cartridge ownership is transferred, retail 
refilling allows for the consumer to retain ownership and track how many times a given 
cartridge has been refilled.  A retail refill was modeled assuming a commercially 
available inkjet cartridge refilling machine was used to refill a cartridge.  Materials and 
energy required to refill a cartridge were included, but materials and processes required to 
build and transport the refilling machine to the retailer were excluded. 
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Remanufactured inkjet cartridge 
 A remanufactured inkjet cartridge is an inkjet cartridge that has undergone 
processing by a third party that includes filling the cartridge with ink and packaging 
comparable to packaging of a new OEM inkjet cartridge.  A remanufactured cartridge can 
vary in environmental impact due to numerous factors, some of which have been 
considered in previous printer cartridge LCA studies detailed in the Appendix.  Our base 
assumption assures that the remanufactured cartridge performs on par with an OEM 
cartridge.  However, differences amongst remanufacturers will ensure variability in 
environmental impact for any given remanufactured cartridge (that satisfies our 
performance assumption) on the market at any point in time.  Based upon market 
observations and industry data [29], there are three sources of variability in 
remanufactured cartridge environmental impact investigated in this study: spent cartridge 
travel distance, spent cartridge quality, and remanufacturer efficiency. Specifically, two 
spent cartridge travel distances (500 and 2,300 miles), two input cartridge quality levels 
(virgin and mixed), and three remanufacturing efficiencies, expressed as the number of 
cartridges required to produce one remanufactured cartridge (1.09 representing high 
efficiency, 2.33 representing moderate efficiency, and 3.57 representing low efficiency) 
are examined.   Spent cartridge collection operations are modeled by a collector traveling 
300 miles with a small truck, and then the remaining travel distance is modeled using a 
large truck.  A “virgin” cartridge is an OEM cartridge that has undergone one use cycle, 
where the “mixed” cartridge quality designation consists of a blend of 25% virgin and 
75% non-virgin cartridges.  In the United States, consolidation has resulted in a small 
number of large volume cartridge remanufacturing facilities.  We assume the base 
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remanufactured cartridge in our study is produced by a highly efficient remanufacturer 
from a virgin cartridge that traveled 2,300 miles to the remanufacturing facility.  The 
transport distance by large truck that a remanufactured cartridge travels to a retailer in 
Rochester, NY USA is fixed at 1,273 miles. 
MSW and Recycling 
Municipal solid waste (MSW) was modeled using the US Waste scenario in the 
ecoinvent database.  Inkjet cartridge recycling assumed that only the plastic housing 
(primarily PET) was recovered and used in the production of new OEM inkjet cartridges.  
2.2.5 Impact assessment 
 Impact assessment was carried out in SimaPro 7.3 LCA software using 
Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) version 1.07 and Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
over 100 years using IPCC 2007 GWP 100a.  CED and GWP were chosen as 
representative proxies for environmental impact for three reasons: (1) no activity related 
to inkjet cartridges considered in this study poses human health risks beyond those 
indicated by CED and GWP100, (2) preliminary screening using other impact assessment 
methodologies (e.g., TRACI) were found to trend as CED and GWP100 categories, and 
(3) GWP allows us to compare our findings with previous printer cartridge LCA studies 
that reported results using GWP impact assessment (although some previous studies use 
GWP100a based on IPCC assessment reports prior to 2007).   Results are shown using 
either GWP100 or CED when the two assessment methods track similarly, and when 
these indices differ, results are presented with both assessment methods.  
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2.2.6 Sensitivity analysis 
 LCI and LCIA results were interpreted based on the goal and scope of the study to 
compare inkjet cartridge EOL routes and reuse options compared to OEM cartridges to 
achieve five use cycles using environmental indicators of interest.  A sensitivity analysis 
was performed on key assumptions pertaining to consumer purchasing manner, consumer 
transport, recycled PET content in an OEM cartridge, and inkjet cartridge 
remanufacturing as follows: 
Consumer purchasing manner 
 Under one at a time purchasing, three cases were compared: five OEM cartridges, 
one OEM cartridge refilled four times, and five remanufactured cartridges.  But five 
inkjet cartridge use cycles may be attained by varying the amount of inkjet cartridges (or 
alternatives) purchased at one time.  Hence there are several combinations of OEM and 
reuse cartridge alternatives that a consumer may select that still satisfy the functional unit 
of five inkjet cartridge use cycles while requiring less than five consumer transport 
activities.  We specifically consider combinations of OEM cartridge and refill purchases.  
Consumer transport 
 The base case assumes the consumer uses an automobile to make a dedicated visit 
to a retailer to purchase a single cartridge or refill a cartridge.   Alternate modes of 
transportation, reducing the percent of the transport impact allocated to the cartridge (i.e., 
performing multiple tasks on the same trip), and reducing transport distance may enable 
consumers to reduce environmental impact associated with cartridge EOL decisions and 
reuse alternatives.  Alternate consumer transport scenarios were investigated to 
demonstrate environmental savings that a consumer could achieve, such as a walking or 
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bicycling (0% allocation), combining inkjet cartridge purchase or refill with weekly 
shopping (50% allocation), and choosing to purchase a cartridge as part of an existing 
commute for a job (10% allocation). 
Recycled PET content of OEM inkjet cartridge 
 The base case assumed OEM inkjet cartridges were manufactured with 100% 
virgin PET.  But some OEM inkjet manufacturers incorporate recycled  PET into inkjet 
cartridges production [30].  Five levels of recycled PET content in the representative 
inkjet cartridge were evaluated.  
Inkjet cartridge remanufacturing 
 The base case assumed a remanufactured cartridge was produced by a highly 
efficient remanufacturer from a virgin inkjet cartridge that traveled 2,300 miles.  The 
“best” remanufacturing case has the spent cartridge traveling 500 miles.  The “worst” 
remanufacturing case pertains to a remanufactured cartridge produced by a lowly 
efficient remanufacturer from a mixed stream of spent cartridges that traveled 2,300 
miles. 
2.3 Results and discussion 
 The HP 60 inkjet cartridge bill of materials and processing data shown in Table 
2.3 reflect the base case assumption of 100% virgin material used in the production of an 
inkjet cartridge. Transportation from different manufacturing locations to their typical US 
port by barge and ground truck transportation to Rochester, NY is shown in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.3 Bill of materials and processes for the manufacture of one OEM inkjet 
cartridge  
BOM 
Level 
Assembly / 
Material 
Ecoinvent Material/Process Used Amount (g) 
1 Housing / Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) 23.64 
  1.1  Polyethylene terephthalate, granulate, bottle grade, at plant/RER   20.09 
  1.2  Glass fibre, at plant/RER   3.55 
  Process  Injection moulding/RER   23.64 
2 Inkjet circuitry / Flexible printed circuit board 0.1 
  2.1  Copper, secondary, at refinery/RER   0.015 
  2.2  Gold, secondary, at precious metal refinery/SE   0.001 
  2.3  Ethylvinylacetate, foil, at plant/RER   0.03 
  2.4  Integrated circuit, IC, logic type, at plant/GLO   0.004 
  2.5  Cable, ribbon cable, 20-pin, with plugs, at plant/GLO   0.05 
  Process  Production efforts, transistors/GLO   0.1 
3 Cartridge label / low density polyethylene (LDPE) 0.05 
  3.1  Packaging film, LDPE, at plant/RER   0.045 
  3.2  Adhesive for metals, at plant/DE   0.005 
  Process  Production of carton board boxes, offset printing   0.05 
4 Ink delivery system / foam 1.34 
  4.1  Polyurethane, rigid foam, at plant/RER   1.34 
5 Print head / semiconductor 0.11 
  5.1  Adapted from Integrated circuit, IC, logic type, at plant/GLO (removed epoxies and lead)   0.11 
6 Ink / Solvent-based ink 15 
  6.1  Water, deionised, at plant/CH   11.7 
  6.2  Pentane, at plant/RER   1.05 
  6.3  N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone, at plant/RER   1.05 
  6.4  Carbon black, at plant/GLO   1.05 
  6.5  Butane-1,4-diol, at plant/RER   0.15 
7 Inkjet packaging / multiple materials: 35.12 
  7.1 
Low density 
polyethylene  
Packaging film, LDPE, at plant/RER   0.19 
  7.2 Paperboard Corrugated board, recycling fibre, double wall, at plant/RER   1.76 
  7.3  Corrugated board base paper, wellenstoff, at plant/RER   24.58 
  7.4 Paper Paper, woodfree, coated, at integrated mill/RER   5.63 
  7.5 Pigments Pigments, paper production, unspecified, at plant/RER    1.8 
  7.6 Foil Sealing tape, aluminum/PE, 50 mm wide, at plant/RER   1.16 
8 
Cartridge 
assembly 
Adapted from average metal working Steel/RER (substituted 0.23 kg PET for steel) 75.36 
 
 
Table 2.4 Cartridge transportation estimates 
Transportation Activity Mode Amount (kg-km) 
Manufacturer to US Ports Transport, barge/RER 679 
US Ports to Rochester, NY Transport, lorry >16t, fleet average/RER 181 
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Objective 1: determine hot spots in the life cycle  
 From Table 2.3, the print head only represents 0.15% (0.11 out of 75 grams) of 
the packaged HP 60 inkjet cartridge, but is responsible for 20% of the cartridge CED, as 
shown in Figure 2.2.  This finding is understandable, since the print head was modeled as 
an integrated circuit in ecoinvent.  On the other hand, ink contributes 20% (15 out of 75 
grams) by mass of a packaged OEM cartridge from Table 2.3, but only 3.2% toward 
CED.  These findings support our initial hypothesis that maximizing print head life 
through refilling or remanufacturing may enable users to reduce the environmental 
impact associated with inkjet cartridge consumption. 
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Figure 2.2 Cumulative energy demand (MJ) (a) contribution by component and 
production processing (b) compared to component weight. 
 
Objective 2: comparison of inkjet cartridge versions - OEM, refilled and remanufactured 
 Table 2.5 summarizes the GWP impact results on a per use cycle basis, excluding 
impacts from the consumer transport activity, so that a comparison of each cartridge 
alternative (i.e., OEM, Remanufacture and Refill) can be compared with previous 
cartridge LCA studies summarized in Table 2.1. In order to report on a per use cycle 
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basis, total impacts for each alternative (i.e., OEM, Remanufacture and Refill) were 
summed and then divided by five.  Since previous results varied in assumptions regarding 
the use phase, impact results for each alternative in Table 2.5 are presented using our 
base case, which excludes cartridge use phase impacts, as well as an alternate scenario 
that includes use as defined in section 2.2.4.  The GWP impacts of the OEM cartridge 
(excluding use phase) from Table 2.5 compare similarly with the 1996 inkjet cartridge 
impact results found in Table 2.1[12].  In our study, the contribution from the use phase 
is 0.38 kg CO2 eq per use cycle across all alternatives, which accounts for 36% to 57% of 
total kg CO2 eq.  This is not the case for the 2004 and 2008 studies, which range from 
60% to 96% of total kg CO2 eq [14, 15] due to the inclusion of a “usability” metric for 
printed output.  The refill case offered the lowest environmental impact, with a 76% 
reduction to GWP impact when use phase is excluded and a 37% reduction to GWP 
impact even when considering cartridge use and the associated power use and paper 
consumption impacts.  Next, the baseline remanufacturing case provided an 18% savings 
in GWP impact including use phase and a 36% savings in GWP impact excluding use 
phase compared to the OEM alternative.  
Table 2.5 Cartridge LCA global warming potential impact results per use cycle 
Study 2012 Inkjet 
Cartridge OEM OEM Remanufacture Remanufacture Refill Refill 
Paper None 100 pp None 100 pp None 100 pp 
GWP100 kg CO2 eq 
Production 0.43 82% 0.43 40% 0.26 78% 0.26 30% 0.11 86% 0.11 16% 
Distribution 0.06 11% 0.06 5% 0.05 14% 0.05 5% 0.01 9% 0.01 2% 
Use 0 0% 0.38 36% 0 0% 0.38 43% 0 0% 0.38 57% 
EOL 0.04 7% 0.20 19% 0.03 8% 0.19 22% 0.01 6% 0.17 26% 
Total 0.52 100% 1.07 100% 0.33 100% 0.88 100% 0.13 100% 0.67 100% 
 
 These findings indicate that refilling used cartridges or purchasing 
remanufactured cartridges both offer environmental improvement compared to 
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purchasing new OEM cartridges, when assessed on the basis of one use cycle.  When 
evaluating options on the basis of the functional unit of five inkjet cartridge use cycles, 
the analysis must also comprehend consumer transport activities between use cycles – 
particularly travel to a retailer to either refill an existing cartridge or purchase a new one.  
The manner and mode by which consumers purchase cartridges have not been addressed 
by the previous cartridge LCA studies summarized in Table 2.1.  Since an 8-kilometer 
trip by automobile, fully allocated to the purchase of one inkjet cartridge accounts for 
1.44 kg CO2 eq for GWP (25 MJ for CED), variability in the consumer transport activity 
can substantially influence results.  Figure 2.3 illustrates how results are influenced by 
select assumptions that affect mode of travel, allocation percent, and manner (i.e., 
number of trips) for the consumer transport activity can have on the results. Results in 
Figure 2.3 are divided between one OEM cartridge that is refilled four consecutive time 
(and the degree to which trips to a retailer are allocated to the cartridge) and five OEM 
cartridges (either purchased consecutively in 5 trips or all at once in 1 trip), the latter 
assuming that 100% of the transport activity is allocable to the cartridge. For our base 
assumptions, refilling is the best cartridge option for one at a time purchasers making 
dedicated trips by automobile at 138 MJ.  This refilling option can be reduced to as low 
as 13 MJ when one at a time purchasers chose an impact-free (0% 
allocated)transportation method, like walking or biking to the retailer.  In the case of 5 
OEM cartridges, the minimum total impact possible is 50 MJ, which includes the OEM 
processes and no (or 0%) transportation impact.  Including the transportation in the 5 
OEM cartridge case scenarios results in impact from 175 MJ for the base assumption of 5 
trips and 75 MJ for a single trip. Notably, a consumer that buys five OEM cartridges all 
    
 
30 
at once is equivalent to a consumer selecting refilling one at a time with transport 
allocated at 50%.  
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Figure 2.3 Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) per five cartridge use cycles.  Left: one 
OEM cartridge refilled consecutively four times, with increasing percentages of 
transportation impact allocated to the cartridge life cycle; Right: five OEM cartridges 
purchased consecutively in five trips or all at once in a single trip.  Results are highly 
sensitive to consumer transport assumptions. 
 
 If consumers purchase inkjet cartridges one at a time, then our results show 
refilling provides the lowest environmental impact, regardless of other consumer 
transport factors.  However, removal of the one at a time purchasing constraint enables a 
consumer to achieve additional environmental improvement by reducing the number of 
trips required to obtain the functional unit of five cartridge use cycles.  Since the impact 
for a refill is approximately 11% of the CED value for a fully allocated trip to a retailer 
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by automobile, the environmental savings from reducing the number of consumer 
transport activities overwhelms savings provided from refilling.  If the allocation 
percentage associated with getting a refill for an 8 km trip is less than 11% (i.e., 89% of 
the trip impact can be allocated to other activities like grocery shopping, leisure activities, 
or work commutes), then refilling will provide more environmental savings than 
eliminating one trip. This demonstrates that results are extremely sensitive to consumer 
transport decisions. 
 So far we have looked at either purchasing all OEM cartridges or refilling one 
OEM cartridge four subsequent times.  But five inkjet cartridge use cycles may be 
obtained in other combinations, like purchasing multiple OEM cartridges at a time with 
subsequent refills in another retailer visit.  Figure 2.4 considers the CED for 
combinations of OEM cartridges and refills that achieve five use cycles with consumer 
transports fully allocated to the cartridge life cycles.  Here we see that reducing the 
environmental impacts of the consumer transport activity outperforms the environmental 
savings that can be achieved by refilling. 
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Figure 2.4 Comparison of OEM and refill combination scenarios for fully allocated 
consumer transport activities.  Reducing intensity of consumer transport offers more 
environmental savings than choosing a refill over an OEM cartridge to achieve five use 
cycles. 
 
Objective 3: EOL routes 
 Consumers also have a variety of ways to discard an inkjet cartridge.  
Remanufacture and refill routes considered in this study may result in an inkjet cartridge 
seeing one or more additional use cycles.  However, market data indicate that typical 
EOL routes of landfill, incineration, recycle, and municipal solid waste are more utilized 
than those that lead to inkjet cartridge reuse.  Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the CED and 
GWP contribution of each EOL route compared to impacts for a single OEM cartridge 
delivered to a retailer in Rochester, NY, USA.  
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Figure 2.5 CED contribution for each EOL route relative to the (A) total CED value for 
producing one OEM cartridge available for purchase in Rochester, NY. (B) Shows the 
additional burden for municipal solid waste routes and (C) shows the variable benefit 
attainable from recycling PET at average (8%, comparable to MSW recycling) and best 
rates (100% closed loop), remanufacturing the entire cartridge under Worst-, Base-, and 
Best-case scenarios, and refilling the cartridge up to four times not including consumer 
transport.  
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Figure 2.6 GWP contribution for each EOL route relative to the (A) total GWP value for 
one OEM cartridge available for purchase in Rochester, NY. (B) shows the additional 
burden for municipal solid waste routes and (C) shows the variable benefit attainable 
from recycling PET at average (8%, comparable to MSW recycling) and best rates (100% 
closed loop), remanufacturing the entire cartridge under Worst-, Base-, and Best-case 
scenarios, and refilling the cartridge up to four times not including consumer transport.  
 
Landfill, incineration and municipal solid waste 
The contribution of these EOL routes to total CED are relatively small, compared 
to the manufacture of new cartridges, with increasing impact observed in (1) incineration 
(0.18%), (2) US Waste (0.20%) and (3) landfill (0.35%), respectively, although the 
maximum difference between any of these EOL routes is only 0.2%.  On the other hand, 
the contribution of these EOL routes for the GWP100 impact assessment method range 
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from 8% to 12% with US Waste now having the lowest impact and landfill the greatest, 
due to the potential for methane emissions. 
Recycling 
 Recycled PET from spent inkjet cartridges and water bottles is used in the 
production of OEM inkjet cartridges [30] and provides a credit of approximately 1.49 
MJ, which is 15% of the CED for the OEM cartridge.  This credit from closed loop 
recycling is much higher than the 0.12 MJ credit that would be achieved if PET was 
recycled at 8.2% from the U.S. municipal waste stream [31].  Similarly, recycling an 
inkjet cartridge provides a credit of up to 0.05 kg CO2 eq (10%) for the GWP impact 
assessment method.  Table 2.6 expands on the GWP and CED impact performance for 
cartridges with 0%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 100% recycled PET content.  More than 70% of 
an HP 60 cartridge body (by weight) is currently recycled content from used HP 
cartridges and other sources such as water bottles [32]. At 70% recycled PET content, 
there is only modest environmental improvement for both GWP and CED.   
Table 2.6 GWP and CED impact savings by recycled PET in OEM cartridge 
Recycled PET 
not including use phase and customer transport 
Impact per use cycle GWP 100a 
(kg CO2 eq) 
GWP 
Savings 
CED 
(MJ) 
CED 
Savings 
Virgin PET OEM Inkjet 0.48 N/A 9.90 N/A 
 
30% Recycled PET OEM Inkjet 0.47 3.5% 9.40 5.4% 
50% Recycled PET OEM Inkjet 0.46 5.4% 9.12 7.9% 
70% Recycled PET OEM Inkjet 0.45 7.2% 8.83 10.8% 
100% Recycled PET OEM Inkjet 0.43 10.1% 8.41 15.0% 
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Remanufacture 
 The maximum theoretical reduction in environmental impact from reuse may be 
represented by [1-(1/(1+n))] x 100%, where “n” reflects the number of reuse cycles [33].  
For one inkjet cartridge remanufacturing cycle the maximum theoretical reduction in 
CED would be 4.95 MJ (50% x 9.9 MJ), provided there were no additional actions done 
to the inkjet cartridge to enable another reuse cycle. But a remanufactured cartridge can 
vary in environmental impact due to numerous factors. Three sources of variability in 
remanufactured cartridge environmental impact investigated in this study were spent 
cartridge travel distance (500 and 2,300 miles), spent cartridge quality (virgin and mixed 
input), and remanufacturer efficiency (high, moderate and low). Figure 2.7 illustrates the 
effect on GWP from each of these sources of variability.  From Figure 2.7, it is obvious 
that remanufacturing efficiency has the greatest effect on GWP impact for a 
remanufactured cartridge, followed with spent cartridge input type having a slightly 
greater effect than cartridge travel distance. Although it is impossible to characterize the 
remanufacturing cartridge market due its dynamic nature, consolidation in the inkjet 
cartridge remanufacturing sector serving the US is more likely to result in large 
remanufacturers that leverage their market power to claim high quality cartridges as input 
to their highly efficient operations.  A large remanufacturer of this type would produce an 
inkjet cartridge with a value of 0.33 kg CO2 eq, labeled as “Base” on Figure 2.7  The 
base case is only marginally higher than the “Best” case of a highly efficient 
remanufacturer processing the virgin cartridges that traveled 500 miles at a value of 
0.3265 kg CO2 eq.  This result suggests that environmental improvement obtained from 
increased efficiency through consolidation may lead to aggregate environmental 
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improvement in the sector, since environmental gains from improved efficiency 
outperform environmental impacts from increased cartridge travel distance. 
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Figure 2.7 GWP impact for remanufacturing inkjet cartridges disaggregated by 
remanufacturer efficiency (low and high), input cartridge quality (virgin and mixed) and 
spent cartridge travel distance (500 and 2,300 miles).  Remanufacturing efficiency 
considers the number of input cartridges required to produce one remanufactured 
cartridge (1.09 representing high efficiency and 3.57 representing low efficiency).   
 
 Notably, the worst case remanufacturing case provides a 14% improvement 
compared to the benefit from recycling PET from a spent cartridge.  However, from a 
GWP impact assessment perspective, the worst case remanufactured cartridge case 
provides a 33% improvement over recycling. Where economically motivated 
consolidation in the cartridge remanufacturing sector may lead to environmental benefits, 
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profit motivated collection firms of spent cartridges may route less desirable cartridges to 
remanufacturers instead of incurring a cost associated with recycling them at the onset.  
Spent cartridges of this type may accrue environmental impact from transportation and a 
failed remanufacturing attempt. 
Refill 
  From Figures 2.5 and 2.6, a single refill cycle offers a greater reduction in 
environmental impact than any of the remanufacturing scenarios.  The first reuse cycle 
from refilling provides a reduction in CED of 4.6 MJ, just 7% less than the theoretical 
maximum reduction of 4.95 MJ.  As expected, subsequent refills provide further 
environmental benefit, with four refills providing a reduction of 7.37 MJ. Even though 
refilling provides the best opportunity to reduce environmental impact by extending the 
usable life of an inkjet cartridge, the sensitivity of these findings to the consumer 
transport activity suggest that maximizing environmental savings from reducing 
consumer transport impacts should be examined first. Recall that a fully allocated 
consumer transport activity to purchase an inkjet cartridge alternative is approximately 
2.5 times the CED (3 times the GWP) impact of an OEM cartridge.   
2.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
 Consistent with conventional wisdom, we find reuse of an inkjet cartridge can 
provide an environmental benefit over a new OEM inkjet cartridge.  In exploring inkjet 
cartridge reuse, we investigated two options readily available to US consumers, (1) 
purchasing a remanufactured inkjet cartridge, and (2) inkjet cartridge refilling at a local 
retailer.  The latter alternative enables a consumer to reuse an inkjet cartridge multiple 
times, whereas a spent inkjet cartridge typically undergoes one remanufacturing cycle. 
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With a functional unit of five inkjet cartridge use cycles, results were highly sensitive to 
how a consumer went about purchasing an inkjet cartridge use cycle and the associated 
transportation activity and impact.  Based on these findings, broader implications are 
discussed below. 
Sequential Purchasers 
 For those consumers that purchase and use one inkjet cartridge at a time, and then 
repeat the cycle; refilling an OEM cartridge four consecutive times provides the best 
alternative for reducing environmental impact associated with inkjet cartridge 
consumption.  Although inkjet cartridge refilling cycles offer the greatest opportunity for 
environmental improvement, refilling may not appeal to all consumers.  For those 
consumers that don’t want to retain and refill cartridges, substituting remanufactured 
cartridges for OEM cartridges will provide environmental improvement, but at more 
modest levels. Further improvement in environmental performance may be obtained 
through choosing a mode of travel with lower impacts.  
Multiple Cartridge Purchasers 
 Consumers that already minimize the environmental impact associated with 
consumer transport by purchasing multiple cartridges in a single trip to a retailer should 
not pursue refilling if doing so leads to a net increase in environmental impact from 
additional travel.  However, substituting cartridge refills in place of OEM cartridges will 
yield environmental savings when holding consumer transport constant.  A consumer that 
purchases two cartridges at a time could achieve an environmental benefit by taking two 
empty OEM cartridges to a retailer and getting both refilled as opposed to purchasing two 
more OEM or remanufactured cartridges.   
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 The recommendation of what should be done with a spent inkjet cartridge is less 
obvious, since traditional EOL routes vary for GWP and CED impact categories.  
However, our findings suggest the following guidelines: 
OEM Cartridge 
 A spent OEM cartridge is a preferred input (i.e., “virgin” cartridge) for both inkjet 
cartridge remanufacturers and consumers that want to pursue cartridge refilling.  
Consistent with our findings, a cartridge of this type should be directed to an EOL route 
that leads to reuse. 
Remanufactured Cartridge 
 Since inkjet cartridge remanufacturers have a strong preference for virgin OEM 
cartridges, previously remanufactured cartridges should be directed to cartridge recycling 
as the first best option.  Even though the results indicate additional environmental savings 
may be achieved by the worst case remanufacturer that have some non-virgin cartridges 
in their input stream, environmental impact incurred from less desirable cartridges being 
sent to remanufacturers is likely to result in more cumulative environmental harm than if 
the cartridge was directed to an efficient recycling path.   
Refilled Cartridge 
 A spent cartridge that has been successfully refilled four times, or has failed 
prematurely, should be directed to cartridge recycling as in the recommendation for a 
previously remanufactured cartridge above. 
Since all recycling routes do not have the same environmental impact, care should be 
taken by consumers in selecting a recycling route.  Although OEMs accept their own 
cartridges for recycling, previously remanufactured or refilled cartridges are excluded 
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from voluntary recycling by OEMs.  Consumers desiring to recycle spent remanufactured 
cartridges often drop them off at a retailer for recycling, which requires transport.  Since 
recycling of PET from cartridges provides a 10% GWP reduction in impact (15% CED 
reduction) in the most optimistic case, the environmental harm from the consumer 
transport activity may erode or exceed environmental savings of inkjet cartridge 
recycling.   
 Since consumer decisions related to the manner of purchase/disposal and mode of 
travel have a significant effect on environmental impact for achieving 5 use cycles, it is 
worthwhile to investigate observations from the US market that may influence consumer 
travel.  HP estimates that if all inkjet cartridges returned using return envelopes in 2008 
were instead returned via consumers taking empty cartridges to retailer Staples for 
consolidated shipping to HP’s recycling center, 600,000 pounds of shipping materials 
would be eliminated [34].  While reduced packaging and consolidated shipping offers 
environmental benefits over cartridges returned using return envelopes, the method 
consumers choose to route their empty cartridges to stores may cut into these 
environmental benefits, or even make the in-store return option result in worse 
environmental performance.  As seen from analysis performed here, consumer travel to 
(and from) a retailer represents the largest portion of environmental impact for an inkjet 
cartridge use cycle.  Assuming the number of returned cartridges remains the same, if 
HP’s decision to eliminate return envelopes with new cartridge packaging results in more 
consumer trips to a retailer, then it is likely that environmental performance of the Staples 
return system may be worse than the return envelope system.   
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 Staples policy for cartridge recycling may further promote additional consumer 
trips to Staples stores even for consumers that utilize Staples mail order services.  For 
instance, Staples return policy provides a store credit of $2 (limit of ten cartridges per 
month) for each cartridge brought to a Staples store for recycling, but no financial credit 
for cartridges returned for recycling through parcel delivery [35].   
 Market changes may also encourage more consumer travel related to inkjet 
cartridge use.  As stated earlier, OEMs have expanded cartridge offerings to include low 
and high yield alternatives.  If a consumer purchased low yield cartridges (e.g., HP 60) 
which provides one-third the rated output of a high yield cartridge (e.g., HP 60XL), 
consumer transport could increase three fold over the high yield alternative.  Aside from 
an increased likelihood of consumer transport, printing systems with low yield inkjet 
cartridges have worse carbon footprint performance on a per image printed basis than 
printing systems using high yield inkjet cartridges [36].  Locating a more durable print 
head within the inkjet printer and switching the inkjet cartridges to ink tanks would  
reduce “resource consumption during product manufacturing by 40%, air emissions by 
67%, solid waste generation by 95%, and wastewater by 92% per page printed” [37].  
 Given the complexity of understanding and modeling consumer purchase and 
disposal decision making for inkjet cartridge alternatives, future research is required to 
investigate the trade-offs in convenience, cost and environmental impact associated with 
each purchase and disposal option.  Understanding how consumers perceive these trade-
offs may illuminate opportunities to design and implement incentives to shift consumers 
toward purchase and disposal options with lower environmental impacts.  While focused 
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specifically on cartridge systems here, these outcomes are applicable to other examples of 
consumer decisions across the “green” product space. 
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III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GREEN PRODUCT DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
There is increasing industrial and academic interest in remanufacturing as a more 
sustainable production process compared to those that utilize virgin materials or even 
recycled materials.  The general purpose of this paper is to better understand why current 
market incentives do not seem strong enough to generate socially optimal rates of 
remanufacturing activity and what, therefore, could be done to strengthen incentives.  To 
achieve this goal, we propose combining economic literatures regarding green design, 
“raising rivals’ costs,” and intellectual property rights.  Our specific contribution is to 
show within such a framework that it is possible to raise social welfare and maintain the 
original manufacturer’s profit by strengthening the firm’s intellectual property rights in 
exchange for implementing greener physical product attributes.  This possibility arises 
since a firm may choose a level of physical product attributes in its product that is less 
than socially optimal.  The firm is constrained by the regulator in selecting the level of 
intellectual property rights necessary to deter independent firms from entering the market 
with a remanufactured version of the firm’s product.  While granting stronger intellectual 
property rights might reduce social welfare, ceteris paribus, our model shows how the 
reduction in environmental impact from greater remanufacturing can raise welfare by 
more than stronger intellectual property rights might reduce welfare.    
A novel and counterintuitive aspect of our approach leverages an intellectual 
property rights policy focused to encourage innovation to also affect environmental 
quality.  This unconventional approach was pursued because intellectual property may be 
used by an original manufacturer (OM) to deter independent firms from bringing an 
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environmentally preferred remanufactured version of the OM’s product to market.  
Although establishment of a new policy to encourage remanufacturing is another option, 
our approach minimizes unintended economic and environmental consequences that may 
result from alterations to the structure, conduct and performance of product markets due 
to a new policy intervention.  
Remanufacturing involves recovering value from end-of-life products to 
manufacture like-new products.  Since remanufacturing enables reused value-added 
components to see one or more additional use cycles, remanufacturing retains the 
embodied energy of reused components and is often environmentally preferential when 
compared to energy recovery, material recycling, or reusing components in products with 
less demanding specifications (i.e., downcycling)[8, 38].
1
  Extending lifespan via 
remanufacturing may also reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  These environmental 
benefits from remanufacturing may be complemented by economic benefits.  For 
instance, Giuntini and Gaudette [39]  find that remanufactured products incur costs that 
are typically 40 to 65 percent less than costs incurred for new products, but only sell for 
30 to 40 percent less than similar new products, indicating that there are incentives for 
both producers and consumers to engage in the remanufactured product market.  And as 
Ferrer and Ayres [40] suggest, developing a more robust remanufacturing sector can have 
positive economy-wide impacts in terms of raising the demand for labor and for all other 
goods.  Geyer et al. [38] note that Kodak’s single-use camera core was designed with 
components with a durability level to endure six consumer use cycles.  Since Kodak was 
able to effectively recover spent single-use cameras, remanufacturing proved to be more 
                                                          
1 See Geyer et al. [38].  See also Gutowski et al. [8], as they provide a review of life cycle assessment studies with emphasis on 
energy savings.  They find that remanufacturing usually outperforms new products in terms of energy savings, except when 
improvements in current models of durable energy consuming products have significantly reduced energy consumption during use 
compared with remanufactured versions of less efficient products, such as refrigerators.   
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profitable than new production while providing environmental benefits.  Maslennikova 
and Foley [41] observe that Xerox continues to utilize a modular design strategy for most 
of its products that allows the firm to collect and profitably remanufacture products.  
Xerox was able to transform a potential disposal cost associated with 160,000 Xerox 
machines recovered from customers in Europe (in 1997) into a net savings of $80 million 
by reprocessing these machines [41].
2
     
Notwithstanding the opportunities that remanufacturing presents—and that some 
firms and consumers have captured—there remains a significant flow of 
remanufacturable materials heading to landfills each year.  For instance, one industry 
report estimates that approximately 50% of more than 562 million computer printer 
cartridges consumed annually in the US are thrown away, most ending up in landfills 
[3].
3
  Various reasons for possible gaps between privately optimal and socially optimal 
consumer and firm decision-making regarding remanufacturability are considered in the 
literature.  Several researchers focus upon the level of remanufacturability an original 
manufacturer (OM) selects to design into its products in various market structures.  
Ferguson [42] notes that even though remanufacturing may be cost-efficient relative to 
producing a new product, most firms appear to either ignore or actively deter any 
remanufacturing and reuse of their product.  Since OMs are not guaranteed that 
consumers will route discarded products to either recycling centers or the municipal 
waste stream, an unwanted product transferred by a consumer to an independent 
remanufacturer may re-enter the market as a differentiated product that competes with the 
OM’s product.  Hence, any actions an OM takes to improve the remanufacturability of its 
                                                          
2 Maslennikova and Foley [41] page 228. 
3Source: Cortney Kasuba [3] “It’s Not Easy Being Green” http://rechargermag.com/articles/2008/11/02/its-not-easy-being-
green.aspx. 
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product may enable independent remanufacturers to free-ride on the OM’s investment.  
Debo et al. [43]consider an infinite time horizon model where a monopolist must select 
the product’s remanufacturability level for a heterogeneous consumer market where the 
new product and remanufactured product are considered as differentiated products.  They 
expand their model to consider competition from independent remanufacturers that 
collect the monopolist’s product from period one and offer a remanufactured version in 
the next period.  In this setting, increased competition in the remanufactured product 
market forces reduced prices for remanufactured product and for used remanufacturable 
product.  This result then motivates the OM to reduce the product’s remanufacturability, 
leading Debo et al. [43] to suggest that “any legislator encouraging competition for 
remanufactured products should take into account that the level of remanufacturability of 
the new product will decrease with competition”.  Most recently, Bernard [44] presents a 
model in which OMs provide an interchangeable remanufacturable component part used 
in a durable product with an expected lifetime that exceeds the lifetime of the 
remanufacturable component.  Hence, consumers that purchase the product will require at 
least one replacement component part before the durable product wears out.  Bernard 
finds that when the two OMs collude on the level of remanufacturabilty, the OMs 
internalize their free-riding ability by choosing the level of remanufacturability that 
maximizes joint profit.  Even though collusion by the OMs does not eliminate 
independent remanufacturers’ ability to free-ride on investments made in the level of 
remanufacturability embedded into the component part by the OMs, the collusive case 
has the OMs remanufacturing more components and lower quality independent 
remanufacturers producing less, resulting in an increase in both producer and consumer 
    
 
48 
surplus.  These results provide optimism that government policy instruments can help 
align strategic firm objectives with social welfare. 
Identifying precisely where in the product life cycle government policy 
instruments should be optimally applied is also an active area of research focus.  In 
particular, several researchers have looked into policy instruments that could be used to 
encourage upstream producers to design environmentally-preferred products (i.e. “green 
design”), and encourage downstream consumers to recycle discarded products.  Fullerton 
and Wu [45] were the first to provide a general equilibrium model to consider the 
effectiveness of different policy instruments for promoting recycling of products by 
consumers and encouraging producers to design products to be more recyclable.  They 
find that if consumers bear the full social cost to dispose products, consumers will signal 
producers to reduce product packaging and improve the recyclability of products brought 
to the market.  If consumers don’t pay to dispose unwanted products, then a tax on 
producers’ use of packaging and a subsidy for recyclable designs will achieve the social 
optimum.  Calcott and Walls [46] consider policy instruments to encourage green design 
when consumers have recycling options of (1) free curbside recycling, (2) taking a 
recyclable product to a recycling center for payment, and (3) disposing recyclable 
product in the municipal waste stream.  They find that a deposit-refund scheme combined 
with an advanced disposal fee can lead to a second-best outcome as long as unclaimed 
consumer deposits are not awarded to producers.  And in a recent econometric study, 
Rehfeld et al. [47] find that downstream policy pressure has a positive effect on 
environmental product innovations at the 1% level of statistical significance.  In 
particular, if the OM has a financial obligation of dealing with its product after consumer 
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use (or is interested in remanufacturing its products), the manufacturer is more likely to 
initiate product and process design decisions that influence recycling and waste treatment 
costs. 
Observations in the above literature suggest that there are two additional concepts 
that may be fruitfully brought to bear upon our understanding of the green design 
problem per se: the concept of “raising rivals’ costs” and the conceptual structure of 
intellectual property rights. Salop and Scheffman [48, 49] introduced the concept of 
raising rivals’ costs, wherein a firm with market power may use cost-raising strategies to 
increase its profits by disadvantaging its rivals (competitors) in a dominant firm and 
competitive fringe market.  In their model, an increase in the incremental costs to rival 
firms will shift up the rival firms’ supply curves.  Assuming the dominant firm keeps its 
output the same and the rival firms have relatively elastic supply curves,  the market price 
will shift up to a level equal to the increase in the rival firms’ incremental costs.  The 
dominant firm’s profits will increase as long as its own average costs increase by less 
than the increase in the rival firms’ incremental costs; more generally, they find that a 
dominant firm’s exercise of cost-raising strategies has an ambiguous effect upon prices, 
fringe profit and welfare.  Landes and Posner [50] explore the implications of the Salop 
and Scheffman model in the context of intellectual property rights assignments.  In their 
model, the dominant firm can utilize its intellectual property right strength to curb the 
fringe’s output by raising rivals’ marginal costs.4 While stronger intellectual property 
rights raise the dominant firm’s fixed costs, by the logic from Salop and Scheffman, the 
net benefits to the dominant firm from stronger intellectual property rights can be 
positive.  
                                                          
4 We note that in the Landes and Posner [50] model, the strength of intellectual property rights is exogenous to the dominant firm.    
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As noted at the outset, the contribution of the present paper is to combine the 
economics of green design literature with the above two literatures regarding raising 
rivals’ costs and the economics of intellectual property rights to show that a regulator 
could raise social welfare by strengthening the OMs’ intellectual property rights in 
exchange for an increase in remanufacturability built into products by OMs.  The basic 
idea is that an OM can protect profit from independent (aftermarket) manufacturers by 
either reducing the remanufacturability of its product or by enjoying relatively strong 
intellectual property rights.  These strategies can differ in social impact, however, as 
reducing remanufacturability raises consumption of single-use products and therefore 
increases the flow of virgin materials to production and the flow of consumer waste to 
landfills.  These natural resource input flows and waste output flows may be greater than 
socially optimal.  As Bernard [44] emphasizes, public policy in this context must 
incentivize OMs to raise the remanufacturability of their products.  Our results 
complement Bernard’s findings by showing that strengthening the OMs’ intellectual 
property rights—a policy lever that is already in place—provides a compelling incentive 
for enhancing remanufacturability.     
Our paper proceeds as follows:  In Section 3.2, we set forth the basic model, 
showing how an OM’s decision concerning the degree of remanufacturability and the 
independent (aftermarket) remanufacturers’ reaction to the degree of remanufacturability 
can be modulated by the regulator’s award of greater intellectual property right strength.  
We introduce representative functional forms and parameters in Section 3.3 so that the 
model can be solved and its properties illustrated.  Comparative statics follow, showing 
how different specifications for strengthening intellectual property rights might affect the 
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firms’ costs, firms’ profits, and social welfare differentially.  Section 3.4 concludes with 
discussion of the results and directions for future research.  
3.2 Theoretical model 
Although there are many strategies an OM may implement to deter independent 
firms from remanufacturing the OM’s product after a use cycle by consumers, we are 
specifically interested in those strategies the OM may employ that affect the built 
product.  The built product may contain technical barriers in the form of physical product 
attributes intended to deter independent remanufacturers.   For instance, a typical toner 
cartridge used in a laser printer has a housing comprised of two plastic pieces that are 
joined together using a zig-zag ultrasonic welding operation by the OM that results in the 
toner cartridge housing or other components being damaged / destroyed during 
disassembly [51]. This type of physical product attribute increases the unit cost of 
remanufacturing the toner cartridge, for both the OM and independent remanufacturers.  
Physical product attributes embedded in a product are denoted by ρ in our model, where ρ 
is defined such that 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. When ρ is equal to zero the product does not have any 
physical attributes that deter remanufacturing, while when ρ is equal to one, the amount 
of physical product attributes contained in the product make remanufacturing impossible.  
It is important to clarify how our use of ρ differs from previous literature that consider ρ 
defined as a product’s level of recyclability [45, 46] and q defined as a product’s level of 
remanufacturability[43, 44].  Calcott and Walls [46] and Fullerton and Wu [45] use ρ as a 
scalar index to represent a product’s level of recyclability, where  ρ can be thought of as 
representing the fraction of the weight of the product that can be recycled; as  ρ increases, 
the product becomes more recyclable.  In their case, ρ is considered to be a non-material 
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input (e.g., a fixed cost) and average costs of the product are increasing with ρ.  Since we 
consider ρ as a cost-raising strategy in the form of a physical feature introduced into the 
product, ρ has a fixed cost component that increases in ρ and a unit cost component that 
also increases in ρ.  That is, if an OM chooses to implement a technical barrier in the 
product to deter independent remanufacturers, the strategy will result in the OM incurring 
a fixed cost component (e.g., additional labor during the product design stage) while the 
physical product attribute added to the product increases unit costs.  Our use of ρ is 
related to level of remanufacturability, q , used by Debo et al. [43] and Bernard [44].  
Increases in ρ and q both result in increased fixed costs and increased unit costs of new 
production for the OM, but increased q results in lower remanufacturing costs whereas 
increased ρ results in higher remanufacturing costs.  This is because ρ is a cost-raising 
strategy.  A toner cartridge designed with fasteners that are easily removed to enable 
worn internal component repair or replacement would have a lower value for ρ than a 
toner cartridge with the zig-zag ultrasonic welding joining method.   
As an alternative to physical product attributes (ρ) introduced into its product, an 
OM may select a level of intellectual property to embed in its product.  Intellectual 
property may take on many forms, including trade secrets, industrial know how, 
proprietary software, patents, trademarks and copyrights.  An individual may seek 
protection for some intellectual property by appealing to the appropriate government 
agency.  For instance, the United States federal government has laws that relate to 
patents, copyrights and trademarks.  A valid patent gives the patent owner (the OM in our 
case) exclusive rights to produce and sell products covered by the patent claims for a 
specified duration under the governing intellectual property rights system.  An 
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independent remanufacturer desiring to remanufacture the OM’s product would (1) be 
required to pay the OM a license fee, or (2) incur costs to “design around” the patent 
claims, or (3) risk a patent infringement lawsuit.  In our model, we follow Landes and 
Posner [50] by representing intellectual property embedded in a product by variable z, 
where 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.  A product without any intellectual property designation would have a 
level of z equal to zero, whereas a product with z equal to one would fully protect the OM 
from competition in the product market—protection from private firms offering a new 
product that violates intellectual property rights of the OM’s product and by independent 
remanufacturers.  Unlike ρ that results in increased costs to remanufacture by either the 
OM or an independent remanufacturer, the level of z embedded in a product by the OM 
raises the costs of independent remanufacturers and competing firms in the new product 
market.  Hence, as we show below, a profit-seeking OM would select the level of z (and 
ρ) to embed in its product by equating the marginal benefit of z (resp., ρ) equal to the 
marginal cost of z (resp., ρ). These privately optimal rates may diverge from socially 
optimal rates.  
It is important to pause and recognize that there may be several reasons why an 
OM and its design engineers may prefer certain physical product attributes and 
intellectual property structures that are independent of how they affect the product’s 
remanufacturability level.  For instance, ultrasonic welding of plastic halves for toner 
cartridges likely provides a more robust, tamperproof fastening method than screws, 
possibly reducing the OM’s product liability risk.  Similarly, intellectual property 
embedded into a product may enable the product to have enhanced features desired by 
consumers, and may enable the OM to use a proprietary production process with a variety 
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of benefits.  In what follows, our goal is to show how such design decisions (captured in 
the abstract by variables ρ and z) nevertheless do affect the product’s remanufacturability 
and, consequently, social welfare.   
We consider an OM that manufactures a product and is considered a monopoly in 
the first period but faces competition in the second period from fringe firms offering a 
remanufactured version of the OM’s new product.  Without loss of generality, we 
normalize the number of fringe firms in the market to one.  Consumed products in the 
first period (commonly referred to as “cores”) become available inputs to both the 
dominant OM and the fringe to produce remanufactured versions of the new product still 
in production.  We assume consumers drop off cores to the OM and fringe firms, and 
receive no payment for returning a core.  Such could be the case under a product take-
back law, or a deposit-refund scheme.  The parameters and decision variables for our 
model are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3.1 Parameters and decision variables 
Symbol Definition 
ρ The level of physical product attributes in the product to deter 
independent firms from remanufacturing the OM’s product 
z The level of intellectual property rights in the product 
Q1 Quantity of new products by the OM in period one 
P1 New product price in period one 
c(z,ρ,Q) OM’s cost function for new product output Q for embedded levels of z 
and ρ  
F(z) OM’s fixed cost per unit of z 
G(ρ) OM’s fixed cost per unit of ρ  
Qo,n,2 Quantity of new products by the OM in period two 
Po,n,2 New product price in period two 
Qo,r,2 Quantity of remanufactured products by the OM in period two 
Po,r,2 =Pf Price for a remanufactured product 
Qf (ρ, z) Quantity of remanufactured products by a fringe firm in period two 
δ Willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product 
co,r,2(z, ρ, Qo,r,2) OM’s cost to remanufacture for output Qo,r,2 with levels of z and ρ 
cf(z, ρ, Qf (ρ, z)) Fringe firm’s cost to remanufacture output Qf (ρ, z) by using the OM’s 
product as an input with embedded levels of z and ρ 
QMSW Quantity of product routed to the municipal solid waste stream 
QMSW = Q1 + Qo,n,2 - Qf (ρ, z) - Qo,r,2 
D(QMSW (ρ, z)) Environmental harm associated with the product that enter the 
municipal waste stream instead of being remanufactured 
  
  
In the two-period model, the dominant firm’s (OM’s) optimization problem is to 
maximize profit: 
 , , , ,1 , ,2 , ,2
1 2max where
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As detailed in Table 3.1, the subscripts on Q and c denote (a) the OM by O, (b) n 
for new product and r for remanufactured product, and (c) period by 1 or 2.  In the first 
period, the OM does not encounter any competition and acts as a monopoly.  In the 
second period, the OM acts like a dominant firm with a competitive fringe supplying the 
market with remanufactured versions of the OM’s product that have been used in period 
one and then reclaimed by third-party firms.  The OM is able to sell its new product and a 
remanufactured version of its product in the second period.  Recognizing that a 
remanufactured product is differentiated from a new product, we assume each 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product is a fraction δ of their 
willingness to pay for a new product, where 0 1  [52].  This assumption tells us that 
we have a vertical differentiated product market where consumers prefer a new product 
to a remanufactured product for the same price.  However, we assume that consumers are 
not able to discern the firm’s choice of ρ and z in the product, and consumers face a 
marginal cost of disposal equal to zero. 
For simplicity, the sum of the competitive fringe output may be represented by 
one firm with profit function 
{ }
* ( , ) ( , ( , ))f f f f f
Q
f
P Q z c z Q z     where , ,2f o rP P  if 
(as we assume) consumers have the same willingness to pay for a remanufactured 
product regardless of the firm that remanufacturers the product.  We assume the OM’s 
cost to remanufacture its own product is less than the cost for a fringe firm to 
remanufacture the product.  The rationale supporting this assumption is that the OM has 
access to proprietary information pertaining to the design of the product, brand 
recognition and a first-mover advantage over a fringe firm such that the OM will have a 
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lower cost for remanufacturing than a fringe firm for any given ρ and z.  We assume this 
is the case even if a fringe firm has cost advantages in specific categories such as core 
collection, being able to pay lower wages, or having lower overhead costs, providing the 
OM and fringe firm remanufactured product is of the same quality. 
We follow Salop and Scheffman [49] in having the OM choose price/output 
jointly with cost-raising variables ρ and z.5  Our Qf (ρ, z) is analogous to Salop and 
Scheffman’s [49] y(p,α) or S(p,α) function.  We assume , ,2 1O r fQ Q Q   (i.e., what is 
remanufactured in period 2 cannot exceed what was produced in period 1).  We have the 
following first-order conditions: 
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
( , , )
0O
dP c z Q
P Q
Q dQ Q
  
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5
 We note, however, that our model is different from the seminal Salop and Scheffman [48,49]  models in 
three ways: (1) we present a remanufactured product as a differentiated product (an inferior substitute), (2) 
an OM product discarded by a consumer is used as an input by both independent (fringe) remanufacturers 
and the OM to produce a remanufactured product, and (3) for some period of time, the OM does not see 
competition from independent remanufacturers because it takes time for independent remanufacturers to 
collect and remanufacture the OM product that have been discarded by consumers.   
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Now, 
, ,2o n
f
P
Q


,
, ,2
0
o r
f
P
Q



 and 0
fQ




.  So the signs of the A and B terms are 
positive, corresponding to the terms of a non-price-discriminating firm’s marginal 
revenue (MR) function.  
Simplifying Eq. (3.4), we have  
, ,2 , ,2 , ,21
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            (3.5) 
and the OM chooses p  (where subscript p denotes privately optimal) such 
that
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, or where 
MR(ρ)=MC(ρ).  Raising ρ raises the fringe’s costs, thereby reducing Qf .   
An analogous first-order condition holds with respect to the firm’s choice of z: 
, ,2 , ,2 , ,21
( , , ) ( , , )( , , ) ( )
' ' 0
o n o r o rO
c z Q c z Qc z Q dF z
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z z dz z z
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           (3.6) 
where the A’+B’ terms represent the OM’s marginal benefit (MB, or marginal revenue 
product, MRP) from exercising z.  As for Eq. (3.6), as with Eq. (3.5), the OM would 
choose pz such that 
, ,2 , ,2 , ,21
( , , ) ( , , )( , , ) ( )
' '
o n o r o rc z Q c z Qc z Q dF z
A B
z dz z z
   
    
  
, or 
where MR(z)=MC(z).  It is helpful to examine the graphs of the OM’s privately optimal 
choices of p  and pz (Figures 3.1 and 3.2), as opposed to the socially optimal choices s  
and sz (Figures 3.3 and 3.4): 
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( )pMC 
( )pMB 
$

p
( )pMC z
( )pMB z
$
zpz
Figure 3.1 OM optimal selection for ρ. Figure 3.2 OM optimal selection for z.
 
A few observations are in order: 
1. The OM’s privately optimal choices p  and pz are by definition not able to be 
improved upon by the OM’s substitution of ρ for z, or vice versa.  A proof by 
contradiction shows why.  First, consider any ρ less than p .  In that case, 
MB(ρ)>MC(ρ).  But this gap (lost profit) cannot be balanced by or compensated for by 
taking pz z .  Taking pz z reduces the OM’s profit even further.  The same argument 
applies to choosing p   or pz z .  Alternatively, consider that the privately optimal 
pair ( p , pz ) is at the center of circular iso-profit functions, as in, for instance, Holland et 
al. [53].   
2. If it is the case, however, that (a) the environmental harm from QMSW is not directly 
taken into account by the OM and (b) that the OM is not currently able to exercise z all 
the way to pz  (because of prevailing intellectual property right guidelines or rules), then 
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we will see in the social planner’s problem (introduced below) that we have an additional 
term that raises MCs(ρ) above MCp(ρ) as shown in Figure 3.3.  At the same time, if it is 
possible that current intellectual property policy restrains the OM to ˆ pz z  in Figure 3.4, 
then there is a Pareto-improving basis for exploring the tradeoff between ρ and z.  We are 
inclined to believe that in fact OMs are constrained in reaching their privately optimal 
choices of intellectual property right strengths, based on the fact that in the United States, 
fewer than half (approximately 46%) of patent applications have been approved over the 
last ten years, while patent applications increased 65%, from approximately 315,000 in 
2000 to 520,000 in 2010 [54].
6
  In addition, not all claims that OMs originally list in their 
patent applications are approved by patent officers.  As OM profit is reduced in Figure 
3.3 if the OM were to implement s p   , see that OM profit can be expanded (i.e., can 
be made whole) in Figure 3.4 if the OM is able to raise z from zˆ  to pz .  Depending upon 
the slopes of the functions in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, a modest increase in z could lead to a 
more than modest reduction in ρ; this in turn can reduce environmental harm and raise 
social welfare. 
                                                          
6 Source: US Patent and Technology Office [54] http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#by_type.  
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Figure 3.4 Private and social optimal selections for z.Figure 3.3 Private and social optimal selections for ρ.
 
We turn now to the social planner’s problem, which is to maximize social welfare 
taking into account consumer surplus, all firm profit, and the environmental harm from 
products that enter the municipal solid waste stream.  The social welfare function is: 
  1 2 1 2 ,  f MSWW CS CS D Q z                                                                     (3.7) 
Recall in period two, we have a differentiated product market and consumer surplus is 
represented by 
* * *
1 , ,2* * *
2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
0 0 0
( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
o r fQ Q Q
o n o n o r o r f fCS P Q P dQ P Q P dQ P Q P dQ         whereas 
in period one we only have the OM producing a new product with consumer surplus 
represented by
*
1 *
1 1 1
0
( ( ) )
Q
CS P Q P dQ  .  Environmental harm from products that enter 
the municipal solid waste stream may be represented by D(QMSW (ρ, z)) where QMSW = Q1 
+ Qo,n,2 - Qf (ρ, z) - Qo,r,2.   
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In period one, the OM is a monopoly and can invest in some combination of z and 
ρ that will raise an independent remanufacturer’s cost to produce a remanufactured 
version of the OM’s product in period two.  The asymmetry in this model results from the 
assumption that only the OM, not an independent remanufacturer, can invest in some 
level of z with associated fixed costs F(z) and some level of ρ with fixed costs G(ρ) in 
period one, such that (1) the level of z granted to the OM increases the marginal costs of 
an independent remanufacturer in period two, and (2) the level of ρ chosen will increase 
the OM’s marginal costs to produce new units in both periods, and increase both the 
OM’s and an independent remanufacturer’s cost to produce remanufactured units in 
period two.   The social planner’s first-order conditions are: 
1 2 1 2 * 0
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Q
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Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) together imply that the socially optimal rates of ρ and z are where: 
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Dividing Eq. (3.10) by Eq. (3.11) and simplifying, we have: 
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                                                  (3.12) 
Eq. (3.12) is seemingly complicated, but it has nice intuition: the social planner (policy 
maker) wants to adjust z and ρ such that the ratio of marginal damages avoided (on the 
RHS) just equals the necessary ratio of reductions in consumer surplus and profit from 
OM and fringe firms (on the LHS).  Note that 
f



and 
f
z


are both negative, and that 
all
CS



and 
CS
z


terms are either zero (if the OM raises output) or negative (if the OM 
does not raise output).
7
  Also MSW
Q



, MSW
Q
z


>0 (i.e., we’ll have less remanufacturing 
and therefore more product going to MSW), but MSW MSW
Q Q
z 
 

 
 because greater ρ 
increases remanufacturing costs of both the OM and the fringe firms, reducing total 
output of remanufactured product. 
 Totally differentiating Eq. (3.7) we get: 
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Setting  0dW   and collecting terms we get: 
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7 As in Salop and Scheffman [49] page 26, whether the OM is inclined to raise or maintain output as its choices of ρ and z reduces 
the fringe output is ambiguous. 
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The RHS of Eq. (3.14) can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
s s
s s
MB MCdz
d MB z MC z
 


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
                                                                                           (3.15) 
When MBs(ρ) = MCs(ρ)and MBs(z)=MCs(z), 0dW   and welfare may be represented by 
point G in Fig. 3.5.
8
  If we take a little more z and ρ, then we will be northeast of point G 
in quadrant j; as in our formula for 
dz
d
 from Eq. (3.15) we will have MBs(z)<MCs(z) and 
MBs(ρ) < MCs(ρ).  This is because while MBs is positive at greater z, it is less positive 
than the MCs at z greater than zˆ  and ρ greater than ˆ .  Since both the numerator and 
denominator of the RHS of Eq. (3.15) would be negative, and the RHS is preceded by a 
negative sign, the slope of any point on any iso-welfare function in quadrant j is negative.  
The slope of an iso-welfare function in quadrant h is negative for the same reasons.  
Finally, the slope of an iso-welfare function in quadrants i and k must be positive, since 
either the numerator or denominator of the RHS of Eq. (3.15) will be positive while the 
other (numerator or denominator) is negative, preceded by a negative sign.     
                                                          
8 Note that we illustrate the iso-welfare functions in Figure 5 with ellipses, as in Holland et al.  [53] Figures 2 and 3, however, the 
iso-welfare functions may be circles.  The important point is that the level set is convex by the assumptions on the functions that 
comprise the welfare function.  Qualitatively speaking, increases in z reduce the quantity of products provided by the OM, which 
reduces consumer surplus but also reduces the amount of products routed to municipal solid waste.  In contrast, increases in ρ lead to 
an increase in the amount of product routed to municipal solid waste.  Iso-welfare ellipses would be vertically (horizontally) oriented 
if the welfare reduction from an increase in ρ (resp., z) exceeds the welfare reduction from the same increase in z (resp., ρ). 
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Figure 3.5. Private iso-profit curves (dashed circles) with social iso-welfare curves 
(ellipses) for selections of z and ρ. 
 With the iso-welfare function in place, we conclude this section by adding the 
OM’s iso-profit function as dashed circles in Figure 3.5.  Doing so enables us to 
conceptualize welfare improvement that also maintains firm profit (for incentive 
compatibility).  Point D in Figure 3.5 represents the OM’s unconstrained privately 
optimal profit level. Since the OM appears to in fact be constrained in the amount of z it 
can embed in its product for which it would be granted intellectual property rights by the 
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regulator to ˆ pz z , the OM’s constrained privately optimal profit may be represented by 
E in Figure 5.  The key result of our paper is that Pareto-improvement can arise from 
offering the OM stronger intellectual property rights in exchange for greater 
remanufacturability built into its products.  In Figure 5, such an exchange would move 
the OM northwest from point E.  Two possibilities immediately present themselves.  
First, we might ask “How much remanufacturability could we obtain from the OM that 
leaves its profit unchanged?”  The answer to this question is given by point F.  The 
improvement in remanufacturability is represented by the reduction of physical product 
attributes (to deter independent remanufacturers) from p to s .  Observe that point F is 
located on a higher iso-welfare function than point E.  This leads us to a second question, 
which is “How high could welfare be if the regulator is constrained to preserve the OM’s 
profit?”  The answer to this question is given by the coordinates at point L, where an iso-
welfare function is tangent to the OM’s baseline iso-profit function.  In this case, 
remanufacturability improves as physical product attributes are reduced from p to 
* .  
The degree of intellectual property strength necessary to achieve this Pareto-improvement 
may be relatively modest (i.e., 
*
pz z ).  The Pareto-improvement from point E to point 
L represents the second-best optimum. 
 
3.3 Model simulation 
In this section, we introduce additional assumptions so that we can (a) simulate how the 
market in Section 3.2 operates from both private and social perspectives and (b) illustrate 
how trading stronger intellectual property rights for greener design of products by OMs 
can be welfare-enhancing.  Assume that in the first period, a monopolist OM produces a 
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new product for linear demand given in the (inverse) form 1 1P Q   , and let the OM’s 
cost of producing the new version of the product be represented by the additive 
form 21 1 1( , , )c z Q Q Q    as often seen in the industrial organization literature[55]. 
Suppose that the above functional forms are specified as follows: 1 1100 0.02P Q   
and
2
1 1 1( , , ) 10 0.0075c z Q Q Q   . (Note that ρ, z and private/external costs of dealing 
with discarded products at the end of the first period are set equal to zero for now, but 
will be introduced later in this section.)  We can immediately solve for the monopoly 
quantity and price of new product in the first period; the quantity simultaneously defines 
the number of used products (“cores”) that are available for remanufacturing in the 
second period.   
The OM’s first-period problem is: 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1Max ( ) [100 0.02 ] [10 0.0075 ]Q Q Q Q Q                                                       (3.16) 
Rearranging the first-order condition yields *
1 1636.36Q   and 
*
1 $67.27.P    Note that in 
contrast with this monopoly result, the socially efficient quantity and price (where P = 
MC) is given by *
,1 2571.43sQ   
and *
,1 $48.57sP  .  Note also that the marginal cost at the 
monopolist’s optimal quantity is $34.54, from (1636.36) 10 0.015(1636.36)MC   . 
Up to this point, we have assumed that consumer disposal of cores at the end of 
period 1 is costless, and that the cores do not have value to the OM or any other firm in 
terms of remanufacturing.   Under these assumptions, the monopoly power exerted by the 
OM creates deadweight loss.  However, we note that if core disposal happens to yield a 
marginal external cost that is equal to the monopoly price mark-up, then as Buchanan 
[56] showed, the monopoly power acts like a pollution tax to yield the socially efficient 
    
 
68 
rate of output.  In our example, the monopoly price mark-up (P – MC) is $67.27 – $34.54 
= $32.73. 
Let us hold on to that thought for a moment, however, and proceed to analysis of 
the two-period model.  Assume that consumers have the same market demand for the 
product in period two as in period one and consumers differentiate between new and 
remanufactured products such that their reduced willingness to pay for a remanufactured 
product is represented by a multiplier δ.  At δ equal to one, consumers would be 
indifferent between purchasing a new unit or a remanufactured unit.  We also assume for 
simplicity that consumers are indifferent between remanufactured products from the OM 
and from independent fringe remanufacturers given equivalent quality.    Although 
consumers express different willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products based on the 
specific product, we assume a value of δ=0.70 for our hypothetical product.  With these 
assumptions, we follow Ferguson and Toktay [52] Appendix B in determining prices for 
new and remanufactured products to get  
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2100 0.02 0.02 ( ( , ))o n o n o r fP Q Q Q z      and 
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2(100 0.02 0.02( ( , )))f o r o n o r fP p Q Q Q z      . 
In the second period, the OM is able to produce new products by the previously given 
cost function, 
2
1 1 1( , , ) 10 0.0075c z Q Q Q    or it is able to remanufacture cores into 
remanufactured products according to 2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2( , , ) 5 0.015o r o r o r o rc z Q Q Q   .  Note that 
the OM cost function to produce a remanufactured product has a marginal cost that is 
assumed to start at a lower initial value ($5 vs. $10), but to rise more steeply ($0.03 vs. 
$0.015) than the marginal cost function for new production.  In addition, there is another 
firm f that competes in the remanufactured product market with cost function given 
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by 2( , , ( , )) 2 0.01f f f fc z Q z Q Q    .  This fringe cost specification has a marginal cost 
that starts at a lower point ($2 vs. $5), and does not rise as quickly as the OM 
remanufacturing marginal cost ($0.02 vs. $0.03) but rises more steeply than the OM 
marginal cost for new product production.  These assumed parameter values in the cost 
functions enable us to study the most interesting case in which the OM has an incentive 
to produce positive quantities of both new and remanufactured units and the fringe is 
likewise able to produce a positive quantity of remanufactured units.  Consumers can 
dispose of cores at the end of the first period at zero cost, or they can return them to the 
OM or a remanufacturing competitor.  We can then cast the OM and the remanufacturing 
competitor f as Cournot-competitors, with the OM having two production lines: one 
producing new products and one producing remanufactured products.
9
  The OM’s 
second-period problem is: 
2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2
2 2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) (100 0.02 0.02 ( ))
( (100 0.02 0.02( )))
10 0.0075 5 0.015
o n o r f o n o r f o n
o n o r f o r
o n o n o r o r
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
 

    
   
  
                            (3.17) 
The competitor firm f’s problem is: 
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,,2( , , ) ( (100 0.02 0.02( ))) 2 0.01f o n o r f o n o r f f f fQ Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q            (3.18) 
Eq. (3.17) yields two first-order conditions, as follows: 
2
, ,2 , ,2
, ,2
90 0.055 0.04 0.02 0o n o r f
o n
Q Q Q
Q

 

    

                                                 (3.19) 
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2
, ,2
100 5 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0o n o r o r f
o r
Q Q Q Q
Q

    

      

                   (3.20) 
                                                          
9 We note that the Cournot-Nash framework is fairly standard in the literature; see, e.g., Bernard [44]. 
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And Eq. (3.18) yields a single first-order condition: 
, ,2 , ,2100 2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0
f
o n o r f f
f
Q Q Q Q
Q

   

      

                           (3.21) 
Solving Eqs. (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) simultaneously yields the following results: 
*
, ,2 1207.8o nQ  , 
*
, ,2 362.4o rQ  and 
* 958.7fQ  .  Substituting these quantities into the price 
functions, we get *
, ,2 $57.35o nP  and 
* *
, ,2 $34.60o r fP P  .  See that total 
remanufacturing in the industry in period two is given by 362.4 + 958.7 = 1321.1.  The 
first period yielded 1636.36 cores.  Therefore, 315.26 cores were routed for disposal in 
period two, following their single-use in period one.   
In the model thus far, however, disposal comes at a zero cost to the consumer and 
to society (i.e., the cores just disappear).  As well, at this point in the model the OM’s use 
of intellectual property (z) and physical product attributes (ρ) are present, but silent (i.e., 
set equal to zero).  While, the social cost of core disposal by consumers is not zero, 
difficulties associated with applying a Pigouvian tax on disposal in this context motivated 
our interest in upstream strategies for modulating QMSW via ρ and z.  We now introduce ρ 
and z into the simulation.  In a strict sense, the OM’s intellectual property  may be 
entirely represented in fixed costs and are independent of the number of units produced 
and do not affect the OM’s marginal cost functions.  Hence, the OM will absorb a fixed 
cost for a given level of z, and the level of z may affect a fringe firm’s marginal cost 
function either by increasing the y-axis intercept or the slope. Although we have 
restricted , [0,1]z   to be consistent with previous literature, there will be a specific cost 
function of z seen by the fringe firm, which will be different if z affects the y-axis 
intercept or the slope of the fringe firm’s marginal costs.  Recall the level of ρ signifies 
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the amount of physical attributes incorporated into the design to deter independent 
remanufacturing firms, and so it affects all marginal cost functions, but again may do so 
by either increasing the y-axis intercept or the slope.  Similarly, there will be a specific 
cost function of ρ that will affect the OM’s costs, and a different cost function of ρ that 
will affect the fringe firm’s costs.  For example, for ρ=0.2, the cost function applied to 
the y-axis intercept for the OM’s new product may be $0.40, OM’s remanufactured 
product may be $0.20, and the fringe firm’s product may be $0.33. The possible 
combinations of how ρ and z may affect OM and fringe costs are summarized in Table 
3.2.   
Table 3.2 Cost impact cases for z and ρ  
Case z affecting MC ρ affecting MC 
1 y-axis intercept for fringe  y-axis intercept for all 
2 slope for fringe slope for all 
3 y-axis intercept for fringe slope for all 
4 slope for fringe y-axis intercept for all 
  
It should be emphasized that we do not know the values of z and ρ (and how they 
affect OM and fringe costs) from market data; rather, we selected representative 
parameter values to illustrate the qualitative properties of the model and its results.  
Hence, our example is limited to z and ρ affecting cost functions as shown in Table 3.3.  
Similarly, the environmental damage associated with a product routed to disposal will 
vary for each product.  For our empirical model, we assume each unit of product routed 
to disposal results in a cost to society of $0.10.  Future work could estimate these 
parameters econometrically. 
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Table 3.3 Resulting cost equations for z and ρ for each case 
Case 1 Case 2 
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) (10 ) 0.0075
o n o n o n o n
c z Q Q Q   
  
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) (5 ) 0.015
o r o r o r o r
c z Q Q Q   
 
2
( , , ( , )) (2 ) 0.01
f f f f
c z Q z z Q Q       
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) 10 (0.0075 )
o n o n o n o n
c z Q Q Q   
  
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) 5 (0.015 )
o r o r o r o r
c z Q Q Q   
 
2
( , , ( , )) 2 (0.01 )
f f f f
c z Q z Q z Q       
Case 3 Case 4 
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) 10 (0.0075 )
o n o n o n o n
c z Q Q Q   
  
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) 5 (0.015 )
o r o r o r o r
c z Q Q Q   
 
2
( , , ( , )) (2 ) (0.01 )
f f f f
c z Q z z Q Q     
 
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) (10 ) 0.0075
o n o n o n o n
c z Q Q Q   
  
2
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2 , ,2
( , , ) (5 ) 0.015
o r o r o r o r
c z Q Q Q   
 
2
( , , ( , )) (2 ) (0.01 )
f f f f
c z Q z Q z Q     
 
  
The next step is to compare results when an OM is able to increase the level of z 
embedded in its product in exchange for a reduction in the level of ρ across the four cases 
identified in Table 3.2.  We restrict our analysis to those instances where the fixed costs 
of z and ρ are constrained to allow the OM to earn positive profits in at least one of the 
four cases.  That is, we do not consider cases when the fixed costs of z or ρ are so high 
that if the OM embedded them into its product the OM would have negative profits in all 
four cases.  We assume that the OM has been granted intellectual property rights such 
that z=0.4 and the OM has embedded technical barriers for remanufacturers such that 
ρ=0.5. Under these assumptions we are interested in exploring how OM profit, fringe 
profit, consumer surplus, environmental damage, and net social welfare change as we 
modulate z from z=0.4 to z=0.5 and ρ from ρ=0.5 to ρ=0.4 .  We find there are three 
different sets of results that may occur when we vary the fixed cost functions for z and ρ 
as shown in Table 3.4.  When G(ρ) is greater than or equal to F(z) as shown in columns 1 
and 3 of Table 3.4, OM profit increases for all cases as the OM increases z for an equal 
reduction in ρ; even though fringe profit is reduced in all cases except case 3, net welfare 
is improved in all but one instance.   Whereas, when F(z) is much greater than G(ρ) as 
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shown in column 2 of Table 3.4, the OM would only choose to increase z and reduce ρ 
for cases 2 and 3, but it is interesting that net welfare also increases for these two cases.  
Table 3.5 specifically explores functional forms for fixed costs that cross as we increase z 
or ρ from 0.4 to 0.5, but the results are nearly identical to the same three sets found in 
Table 3.4.    For our simulation, Pareto-improvement occurs for case 3, with consumers 
worse off in only case 4.  Most of the scenarios considered in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 result in 
a decrease in environmental damage and a net increase in welfare. 
Table 3.4 Impact comparison for varying fixed cost functions for z and ρ  
 F(ρ) >= F(z) 
25 ρ vs. 25z/(1+z2)1/2 
 F(ρ)<<F(z) 
10ρ vs. 10e10z  
 F(ρ)>>F(z) 
10e
10 ρ 
vs. 10z 
Case 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
OM Profit + + + + - + + - + + + + 
Fringe Profit - - + - - - + - - - + - 
CS + + + - + + + - + + + - 
Damage - - - + - - - + - - - + 
Net Welfare + + + + - + + - + + + - 
 
Table 3.5 Impact comparison when fixed cost functions for z and ρ intersect 
F(ρ) > F(z) z, ρ =0.4 
F(ρ) < F(z) z, ρ =0.5 
 
23 ρ vs. 25((z/(1+z2)1/2) 
 F(ρ) < F(z) z, ρ =0.4 
F(ρ) > F(z) z, ρ =0.5 
 
25((ρ /(1+ ρ2)1/2) vs. 23z 
 
 F(ρ) < F(z) z, ρ =0.4 
F(ρ) > F(z) z, ρ =0.5 
 
45,000((ρ /(1+ ρ2)1/2) vs. 43,000z 
Case 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
OM Profit + + + + + + + + - + + - 
Fringe Profit - - + - - - + - - - + - 
CS + + + - + + + - + + + - 
Damage - - - + - - - + - - - + 
Net Welfare + + + + + + + + - + + - 
  
In determining the distribution of welfare changes for consumers, the original 
manufacturer, and the fringe firms for these four cases as we modulate z from z=0.4 to 
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z=0.5 and ρ from ρ=0.5 to ρ=0.4, it is worth noting that the OM’s profit is affected by its 
fixed costs associated with z and ρ (i.e., F(z)and G(ρ).  For those cases where the OM 
profit increases and  F(z)and G(ρ) are small, the OM sees between 47% to 80% of the 
total gain in welfare, consumers see 30% to 52% of the total gain, and fringe firms see 
between -16% to 20% of the total gains in welfare.  But when F(z)and G(ρ) are large, the 
OM experiences more modest gains from 20% to 59%, consumer gains range from 44% 
to 47%, and fringe firms see between -0.02% to 32% of total gains in welfare. 
An increase in δ from 0.6 to 0.7 indicates consumers are willing-to-pay more for a 
remanufactured product because consumers perceive the remanufactured product to be a 
closer substitute to a new product, where δ may reflect strong preferences for greener 
products or that functionally the products are considered close substitutes.  As shown in 
Table 3.6, as δ increases consumers desire more remanufactured product, so 
remanufactured output increases in the second period by both the OM and the fringe firm, 
while the OM reduces the number of new units produced in the second period.  Although 
the OM is worse off, the improvement to consumer surplus and fringe firm profit 
outperforms losses in OM profit to yield an increase to social welfare.  Since the number 
of units routed to disposal decreases, environmental impact falls and net welfare is further 
improved.  These results indicate that as consumers perceive remanufactured product 
(both OM and fringe versions) as closer substitutes for new OM product, competition in 
the remanufactured product market restricts prices and reduces the OM’s total profit. 
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Table 3.6 Results comparison as δ increases 
Second Period As δ increases 
New OM units Decrease 
OM remanufactured units Increase 
Fringe units Increase 
Units routed to disposal Decrease 
Total units Increase 
Total OM profit Decrease 
CS  Increase 
Fringe profit Increase 
Social Welfare Increase 
Environmental damage Decrease 
  
3.4 Conclusion and directions for future research 
The purpose of our paper is to combine the economic concepts of green design, 
“raising rivals’ costs”, and intellectual property rights to suggest a new method for 
incentivizing product remanufacturability.  Success along these lines would reduce the 
inefficient flow of virgin materials into production processes and reduce the inefficient 
flow of single-use products to landfills.  The key take-away point from our study is that a 
regulator could raise social welfare by strengthening original manufacturer (OM) 
intellectual property rights in exchange for an increase in remanufacturability built into 
products by OMs.   
Our results align with previous research exploring the remanufacturability level a 
firm will embed into its product.  As in other studies, the OM in our model has an 
incentive to embed a level of remanufacturability in its product that maximizes the OM’s 
profit over a specified time period. The degree of remanufacturability selected by an OM 
is influenced by many factors, including market structure, consumer willingness-to-pay 
for a remanufactured product, OM management’s perception that remanufactured product 
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sales will cannibalize sales of new products, environmentally-motivated regulation and 
the OM’s ability to cost effectively collect, process and sell remanufactured products 
relative to that of independent remanufacturers.  For a product market where 
remanufactured products are desirable, an OM may increase the level of 
remanufacturability embedded in its products if the OM is able to effectively recover its 
products after a consumer use cycle, minimizing the effects of independent 
remanufacturers free-riding on the OM’s investment in remanufacturability level.  As 
Bernard [44] suggested recently, one way forward is for the regulator to allow/encourage 
OMs to agree upon a remanufacturability standard via collusion.  We offer the 
complementary proposal of strengthening intellectual property rights as an incentive to 
encourage greener product design. 
Indeed, we suggest that a modified intellectual property rights system may be 
considered as part of an Integrated Product Policy (IPP) as emphasized by the European 
Commission (EC). IPP, as defined by the EC, promotes environmental product 
innovations to achieve a broad reduction of all environmental impacts along a product’s 
life cycle [57].  Rehfeld et al. [47] find that technology push (i.e., research and 
development activities), market pull and specific firm characteristics have a significant 
influence on environmental product innovations undertaken by a firm.  Our findings 
suggest that policy makers should consider modifications to the intellectual property 
rights’ system as an unconventional tactic to encourage OMs to increase the 
remanufacturability of their products.  OMs with increased intellectual property rights are 
more likely to invest in increased remanufacturability of their product and take-back 
systems to capitalize on future profits from remanufacturing operations once the threat of 
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free-riding by independent remanufacturer’s is eliminated, provided that remanufacturing 
is practical (i.e., profitable for the OM and desired by consumers).  Discarded products by 
consumers that were previously routed to municipal waste or independent 
remanufacturers would now be designed with a sufficient remanufacturability level such 
that the OM will more efficiently provide new and remanufactured product to the market.   
Of course, institutions that administer intellectual property rights already exist, 
such that costly institutional change is not required in order to implement this policy 
lever.  Leveraging this existing public policy mechanism may have lower transaction 
costs than other policy instruments (e.g. taxes and subsidies) or other mandated programs 
(e.g. product take-back systems) that have been considered in the literature as typical 
intervention options to deal with negative externalities associated with discarded 
products.  One might ask why we are not recommending the policymaker mandate a level 
of ρ, and keep the intellectual property system as it is currently?  While social welfare 
may be improved by such a mandate, such a mandate may change the dynamics in the 
market and alter the product system structure, creating opportunities for unintended 
consequences.  Our suggested adjustment to an existing policy lever maintains the 
product system structure, minimizing unintended consequences.   It is not our intent to 
prescribe operational changes that should be made to the intellectual property rights 
system to achieve more remanufacturing.  But the intellectual property rights system may 
be modified so that the regulator awards intellectual property rights contingent upon the 
producer achieving a certain level of remanufacturing activity for products protected by 
the intellectual property rights.  If the negotiated level of remanufacturing is not achieved 
by a defined time table, intellectual property rights could be withdrawn. 
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 One possible extension of our model is to generalize beyond a two-period 
framework that only considers one remanufacturing cycle for the product.  For products 
in sectors with fast evolving technology (e.g., information and communication 
technology) or products that undergo severe mechanical stress, multiple remanufacturing 
cycles may not be practical.  But for those products where multiple remanufacturing 
cycles are likely, it would be interesting to investigate welfare impacts of increased 
intellectual property rights over multiple period and infinite time horizons.  Since the OM 
will likely experience increasing marginal costs with remanufacturing cycles, we 
anticipate the OM will select a finite (optimal) number of remanufacturing cycles to 
undertake, and embed the corresponding remanufacturability level for the optimal 
remanufacturing cycles in the new product.  History tells us that a dominant firm’s share 
of a product market generally falls over time until the point where no firm earns positive 
economic profits [58].  It would be interesting to investigate whether a dominant firm 
effectively remanufacturing its product could be able to maintain a dominant position in 
the product market for a longer period of time, since the OM would be able to suppress 
entry from competitors by offering a lower priced remanufactured version of its product.  
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IV. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF TYING 
UNDER PRODUCT TAKE-BACK 
4.1 Introduction 
The basic premise supporting extended producer responsibility (EPR) is to hold 
producers responsible for the environmental impact of their products at end-of-life.  EPR 
is a policy concept which can be implemented with several different instruments and each 
instrument will have a specific impact on various environmental goals, such as waste 
generation, product design, and the ultimate fate of products at end-of-life [59].  This 
paper investigates consequences that may result from an EPR product take-back 
requirement applicable for a durable product when a producer uses a requirements tie-in 
sales strategy by considering environmental and welfare impacts across both the durable 
and tied consumable markets.  To achieve this goal, we propose combining literatures 
regarding EPR, policy analysis and industrial organization with environmental impact 
assessment findings for a long standing requirements tie-in case to illustrate trade-offs in 
environmental harm and welfare.  Our specific contribution is to show within such a 
framework, that environmental and welfare performance is dependent upon whether 
product take-back legislation is implemented using an individual or collective scheme.  
We find environmental harm is reduced under the collective scheme, but also produced 
the lowest welfare of the alternatives.  Environmental harm is reduced since durables are 
diverted from the municipal waste stream to recovery processing (e.g., recycling), and 
welfare is reduced because firms reduce durable production volumes in response to the 
costs of recovery processing they incur from complying with the take-back regulation. 
Whereas, under the individual take-back scheme, we find a reduction in environmental 
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harm compared to no take-back, but we also find that welfare can be increased if the firm 
implements reuse (e.g., remanufacturing) operations for the durable product.  We also 
note that neither take-back scheme is a sufficient condition to deter the firm from using a 
requirements tie-in sales strategy.   Furthermore, the individual durable product take-back 
scheme may reinforce the use of a requirements tie-in sales strategy, since the mandate 
allows the firm to reduce its costs by remanufacturing durables discarded by consumers 
that may not have been practical prior to the take-back requirement. 
A requirements tie-in (or simply tie-in) is a pricing strategy where a firm sells one 
product (or service), the use of which requires the consumption of a complementary 
product (or complementary service) also sold by the firm.  Some notable examples of 
exclusive supply relationships for product systems include printers and ink cartridges, 
copy machines and copy paper, razor and replacement blades, and branded cameras using 
branded film.   Exclusive supply relationships are often seen in the communications 
sectors such as mobile phone services, internet service, and cable and satellite television 
services.  A firm using tying may engage in several pricing strategies.  Reitzes and 
Woroch [60] thoroughly investigate firm profits, consumer utility and welfare under one-
part pricing, two-part pricing with commitment to usage related prices, and two-part 
pricing when the firm does not commit to usage related prices in advance of a consumer 
selecting their exclusive supplier.  In one-part pricing, firms set the access fee (e.g., initial 
purchase price for a durable good or connection fee for internet services) equal to zero, 
and commit to a usage charge in advance of customers’ choosing their supplier.  One-part 
pricing is just a specialized case of two-part pricing with commitment where the access 
fee is set equal to zero.  In two-part pricing with commitment, firms set a high access fee, 
    
 
81 
but charge cost-based unit prices for usage.  In two-part pricing without price 
commitment, firms set a low access fee, but charge a high unit price for usage, termed 
“bargain-then-rip-off” by Reitzes and Woroch [60].   In their model, Reitzes and Woroch 
[60] consider oligopoly competition of differentiated goods without requiring consumers 
to purchase the good.  They find two-part pricing with unit-price commitment for usage 
is the dominant profit-maximizing policy, despite the prospect of aftermarket 
monopolization associated with two-part pricing without unit-price commitment for 
usage.  In contrast, one-part pricing dominates in terms of both consumer and social 
welfare.  From their analysis, it is clear that profit-maximizing firms should prefer two-
part pricing with commitment for usage prices, and consumers should prefer one-part 
pricing.  Neither firms nor consumers benefit from two-part pricing without commitment.  
However, two-part pricing without commitment can be found in many markets.  It is this 
latter pricing strategy (two-part pricing without commitment) that we wish to explore 
further from firm profit, consumer and social welfare perspectives for the inkjet printer 
and cartridge markets by including environmental harm for markets where a product 
take-back mandate may result in the durable good being either recycled or 
remanufactured.  
A consumer can choose a printer from a variety of manufacturers that offer 
several models (differentiated durable) with unique price schedules for consumables that 
result in a wide range of prices per printed page for a set output level [61, 62].  
Consumers will typically use the current selling price for the consumable (ink/toner 
cartridge) to determine their price per page into the future by amortizing the cost of the 
printer over their expected usage.  When firms offer these products on the market with 
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the same price schedule available to all consumers, consumers are free to select the 
portion of the price schedule for each product offering.  As described, requirements tie-in 
sales would be considered to be a form of second degree price discrimination.  The firm 
is effectively able to price the tied package based on usage of the durable product, 
extracting the maximum surplus from each consumer.  Consumers with large usage 
demands effectively pay more for the durable product than consumers with small usage 
demands [2].   A firm price discriminates in order to increase its profits, but may only do 
so if the firm has (1) some market power, (2) can infer consumers’ willingness to pay and 
(3) can prevent or limit resales from consumers who pay a lower price to those who pay a 
higher price [2].  
There are many articles focused on identifying the welfare implications of tying.  
In a seminal paper, Whinston [63] showed that tying can be used as a strategy by a 
monopolist in the tying product market to drive out competition in the tied product 
market, and thus extract monopoly profits in the tied product market.  Carlton and 
Waldman [64] extended Whinston’s analysis to show a monopolist (or dominant firm) 
can use tying to increase future profits by deterring entry of efficient firms into the tying 
product market and newly emerging markets (tied product market).  Heubrandner and 
Skiera [65] build upon work by Kaserman [66] to show that tying can be welfare 
enhancing if consumers exhibit higher discount rates than firms.  Borenstein et al. [67]  
show that a firm with market power over sales in its associated aftermarkets (i.e., tied 
product) will exercise that power to some extent that results in pricing of tied products 
above their competitive levels, regardless of the market structure in the durable (tying) 
product market.   This finding relies on the firm’s inability to commit to future prices for 
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the tied product.  If commitment were possible, the firm’s ideal strategy would be to 
charge monopoly pricing for the tied product to all locked-in consumers, and charge 
marginal cost pricing for tied products to all future customers that have not purchased the 
firm’s durable product yet.  As a matter of price discrimination theory, the welfare effects 
of tying are ambiguous.   
While the welfare effects of product tying is an interesting and rich topic in itself, 
we are also interested in the environmental harm that may result from use of a tie-in 
strategy, and look to identify the effects an EPR product take-back law for a durable 
product will have across both the tying (durable) and tied (consumable) markets.  The 
effectiveness of EPR policy instruments is a fairly young topic in the literature since EPR 
policy concepts were introduced in 1991 with the German Green Dot scheme.  Fleckinger 
and Glachant [68] show that EPR product take-back is not sufficient to ensure an efficient 
producer response.  When waste management is competitive, individual take-back acts 
like a Pigouvian tax and always yields a higher welfare than a perfectly collusive 
collective take-back scheme using a producer responsibility organization (PRO).  But if 
waste management is not competitive, an individual take-back scheme will perform 
worse than the perfectly collusive collective scheme. Atasu et al. [4] focus on the effects 
of take-back legislation of existing policies such as the mass based Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive of the European Commission.  They find that 
the WEEE directive is not efficient from an economical or ecological perspective and 
argue for a directive with focused targets for different product categories that consider: a) 
EOL treatment cost, b) environmental impact, c) consumer willingness-to-pay for a 
decrease in environmental impact, and d) competition intensity for a specific product 
    
 
84 
market.  They also point out that the WEEE Directive favors recycling over reuse and the 
collective take-back scheme does not incentivize an individual firm to improve its 
product’s environmental quality as would be the case under an individual take-back 
scheme.  
The requirements tie-in situation offers many challenges when determining 
environmental impact over both the tying (durable) and tied (consumable) product 
markets.  In the “bargain-then-rip-off” scenario seen in the printer-cartridge markets, the 
durable product is sold at a low price leading to high levels of consumption, and high 
priced consumables make consumers meter their use of the durable.  Tying leads to 
higher consumption of the durable product, and reduced consumption of the consumable 
product compared to consumption levels if both (durable and consumable) markets were 
independent.  If the environmental impact attributed to the durable product dwarfs 
environmental impact from consumption of the complementary consumable product, then 
a requirements tie-in strategy will result in more environmental harm.  And if 
environmental impact attributed to the durable product is dwarfed by environmental 
impact of consumption of the complementary consumable product, then a requirements 
tie-in strategy will result in less environmental harm than if the products were served by 
independent markets.   
Up to this point we have not discussed what constitutes environmental impact.  
Typically Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is used to characterize environmental impact of 
alternatives, such as competing product design choices, and product EOL treatment 
options.  Although there are many categories that can be examined in the impact 
assessment stage of LCA, for our case study we utilize cumulative energy demand (CED) 
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as a proxy for environmental impact, since neither the durable or consumable product we 
consider consists of materials that pose a significant health risk to humans during their 
use phase and EOL routes. 
While each EOL route has an associated environmental impact, an EPR product 
take-back requirement for a durable product should result in the durable undergoing some 
form of recovery or reuse, such as recycling or remanufacturer.  If the firm selects a reuse 
option, the durable would be routed to recovery processing when reuse is no longer 
practical.  We compare and contrast a scenario where no take-back requirement is in 
place with two possible implementations of a take-back law for the durable product.   The 
two take-back schemes are distinguished by the degree of control that the original 
manufacturer (OM) has on the fate of its returned durable products at EOL.  In the 
individual take-back scheme, the OM has responsibility for collecting returns and 
determines whether returns are immediately recycled, remanufactured one or more times 
before being recycled, or some other acceptable recovery fate.  In the collective take-back 
scheme, the OM pays a fee for each returned durable product for collection and recycling 
operations.  Under the collective scheme, collection and recycling costs are ultimately 
transferred to consumers in the form of increased prices. Where both implementations 
transfer the cost associated with discarded durable products from taxpayers to the OMs, 
only the individual take-back scheme offers the manufacturers an opportunity to offset 
the cost of compliance with the take-back law by engaging in activities to extract value 
from returned durable products.  We argue that reuse (remanufacturing) is in alignment 
with EPR policy goals and is one such way a firm using a requirements tie-in sales 
strategy can extract value from returned durable products. 
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Although recycling is preferred to landfilling in that it recovers some material 
value and energy that has been invested through previous materials processing operations 
[69], remanufacturing involves recovering value from EOL products.  Maslennikova and 
Foley [41] observe that Xerox continues to utilize a modular design strategy for most of 
its products that allows them to collect and profitably remanufacture products .  Xerox 
was able to transform a potential disposal cost associated with 160,000 Xerox copy/print 
machines recovered from customers in Europe (in 1997) into a net savings of $80 million 
by reprocessing these machines [41].
10
     
Since our focus is upon durable products associated with a requirements tie-in 
strategy, remanufacturing a durable product and releasing it to the market as an existing 
model, makes little sense if the durable product market experiences technological 
advances as found in electronic devices.  However, if functions of the durable product are 
maintained over time, it may be advantageous for the firm to reclaim durable 
components/modules from returned product (as in the Xerox case) and use them in the 
production of “new” models.  As stated earlier, a requirements tie-in strategy will result 
in an abundance of durable products brought to the market, with some portion often 
discarded with low levels of “wear and tear” since low and medium usage consumers use 
them sparingly due to the relatively high cost of tied consumables (as in the printer-
cartridge tie). Prior to any type of product take-back mandate, unwanted durable products 
(with a tie-in strategy) would not be desired by consumers (as in a second-hand market) 
since “new” varieties are readily available at relatively low prices.  But an individual 
take-back requirement would ensure discarded durable products are routed to the 
manufacturer, enabling remanufacturing that may not have been viable prior to the take-
                                                          
10 Maslennikova and Foley [41] page 228. 
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back requirement as shown by Webster and Mitra [6].  With assurance that durable 
products would be returned, the requirements tie-in manufacturer could initiate 
investments in product design and supply chain operations to lower future costs of 
remanufacturing returned durable products that would not have been practical prior to the 
take-back requirement.  Recall that under a collective take-back scheme, collected 
products are destined for recycling and an individual producer is not incentivized to 
invest in the environmental quality of its products.  We suggest readers interested in 
remanufacturing strategy under EPR to a recent article by Ozdemir et al [70] that 
investigates the firm’s optimal remanufacturing strategy under an individual EPR take-
back requirement, and review articles by Esenduran[5] and Atasu and Van Wassenhove 
[71, 72]. 
Our paper proceeds as follows:  In Section 4.2, we set forth the firm’s profit 
maximization problem and the social planner’s problem for our three take-back scenarios 
(i.e., no take-back, individual take-back scheme and collective take-back scheme). We 
demonstrate that an EPR product take-back law is not sufficient for the firm to abandon a 
requirements tie-in strategy and we introduce the social planner’s problem considering 
environmental harm.  We introduce representative functional forms and parameters in 
Section 4.3 so that the model properties can be illustrated using environmental impact 
and market data for the printer-cartridge tie-in case study.  Comparative statics follow, 
showing how different implementations of the product take-back mandate might affect 
the firm’s costs, firm’s profits, and social welfare differentially.  We provide sensitivity 
analysis for our assumptions pertaining to environmental benefits associated with 
remanufacturing in Section 4.4, and put our results into perspective using data from the 
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European market for our case study in Section 4.3.  Section 4.5 concludes with discussion 
of the results and directions for future research.  
4.2 Theoretical model 
The firm employing a requirements tie-in strategy is concerned with maximizing 
profit in two markets, the durable (tying) product market and the consumable (tied) 
product market.  We assume there is a fixed number of consumable products (ink 
cartridges) demanded by the market for each durable (printer) produced.  Although 
consumers will have varying usage rates, this assumption may be thought of as the 
average usage rate for all consumers.  However, the demand curve for cartridges is 
influenced by the number of printers released to the market, expanding out as more 
printers are released and retracting inward as fewer printers are released. 
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Figure 4.1 Welfare distribution for independent printer and cartridge markets with Firm 
1 a monopolist in printer market and Firm 2 a monopolist in the cartridge market. 
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First let’s consider the motivation for a firm to implement a requirements tie-in 
strategy.  Figure 4.1 shows the typical monopoly set-up with independent printer and 
cartridge markets where Firm 1 is a monopolist serving the printer market, and Firm 2 is 
a monopolist serving the cartridge market.  Firm 1 produces QM printers at price PM, and 
Firm 2 produces QM cartridges at price PM.  Firm 1 decides to implement a requirements 
tie-in strategy as shown in Figure 4.2.  Here we see that Firm 1 increases production of 
printers from QM to QT and the price per printer drops from PM to PT, such that Firm 1 
makes no profit in the printer market.  But the requirements tie-in strategy results in 
forcing Firm 2 out of the cartridge market and pushes out the demand curve for cartridges 
due to the increased amount of printers Firm 1 released in the market.  Firm 1 now 
produces QT cartridges at price PT, which is higher than the cartridge price (PM) when the 
cartridge market was solely served by Firm 2.  Firm 1’s profit in the cartridge market (as 
shown in Figure 4.2) is larger than when Firm 1 was not using a requirements tie-in 
strategy (as shown in Figure 1).  The impacts to welfare under tying are ambiguous, and 
depend upon the distribution of low, medium and high volume printing consumers.   Low 
and medium volume usage consumers are likely better off under tying, because they reap 
benefit from purchasing a printer that they would not have purchased prior to tying.  But 
high volume consumers are likely worse off, since they pay higher than monopoly pricing 
for cartridges.  However, society would prefer that the number of printers released to the 
market be reduced to where the social marginal cost (SMC) intersects the demand curve 
for printers, hence the motivation for a social planner to mandate a durable take-back 
requirement. 
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Figure 4.2 Welfare distribution when Firm 1 uses a requirements tie-in strategy.  Using 
tying, Firm 1 is able to force Firm 2 out of the cartridge market, and Firm 1 is able to 
increase profits. 
 
So now let’s look at Firm 1’s profit maximization problem when the firm uses a 
requirements tie-in strategy.  Table 4.1 defines the variables and parameters. 
 
Table 4.1 Parameters and decision variables 
Symbol Definition 
piN Price of a durable product in period i. 
qiN Quantity of new durable products that last two periods produced in period i. 
c Cost to produce a new durable product. 
K The firm’s per printer profit from consumables used over the printer’s 
lifetime. 
QT The maximum amount of printers that can be sold per period. 
cr Firm’s cost to recycle a durable product. 
qiR Quantity of remanufactured durable products that last two periods produced 
in period i. 
s Cost savings per remanufactured durable product with [0, )s c . 
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Prior to any take-back mandate for the durable product, the firm’s profit maximization 
problem is:  
{ }
1
max ( )
iN
M
iN iN
q
i
p c K q

                                                                          (4.1) 
Subject to: ,iN Tq Q i  and iNq  must be a non-negative integer i periods.   
As long as the profit (K) from selling consumables over the printer’s lifetime is positive, 
and the profit from printers is non-negative, the firm will produce the maximum level of 
printers (QT) in each period.  From Figure 4.2, we can see that Firm 1 could take a loss in 
the printer market and provide printers to consumers for free.  But we assume that any 
amount of printers beyond QT results in a shift of the cartridge demand curve that reduces 
Firm 1’s profit. We assume the firm has unlimited capacity to produce highly profitable 
consumables.  The firm’s profit maximization under a durable product take-back 
requirement can take on two forms depending on whether the firm is able to 
remanufacture its returned durable product or required to fund the third-party firms for 
recycling the firm’s durable products discarded by consumers.  Under collective take-
back, the firm’s durable product is comingled with other durable products and is routed to 
recycling providers.  Thus the firm’s profit maximization problem under collective take-
back is: 
{ }
1
max ( )
iN
M
iN r iN
q
i
p c K c q

                                                                           (4.2) 
Subject to: ,iN Tq Q i  and iNq  must be a non-negative integer i periods.   
If we assume that cr is set equal to the difference between social marginal cost and 
private marginal cost (SMC-PMC) for printers as shown in Figure 4.2, then cr acts like a 
Pigouvian tax.  Firm 1 would respond by reducing production of printers from QT to QTC 
as shown in Figure 4.3.  This reduction in printers brought to the market per period, 
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results in the demand for cartridges to retract inwards from DT to DTC as shown in Figure 
4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Welfare distribution when Firm 1 using a requirements tie-in strategy is made 
responsible for the cost of recycling its durable products (printers).  Firm 1 reduces the 
quantity of printers brought to the market from QT to QTC, and cartridge demand curve 
shifts inward resulting in a reduction in cartridges from QT to QTC. 
 
A product take-back requirement under the individual scheme provides each firm 
an opportunity to earn profit by harvesting residual value from returned durable product.  
In some cases, recycling may be profitable, leaving the firm with the decision to recycle 
or embark on remanufacturing operations that will likely require investment in product 
design and infrastructure [4].  For this analysis, we assume recycling is the preferred EOL 
treatment under the collective scheme, and remanufacturing is the preferred EOL 
treatment under the individual take-back scheme. With these assumptions, the firm’s 
profit problem under the individual scheme becomes:  
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{ , }
1
max (( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
iN iR
M
iN iN iN r iR iN iR iN iR r
q q
i
p c q p c s c q q q K q q c

                        (4.3) 
Subject to:  , 1,2iN Tq Q i   
  , 3,4.....iN iR Tq q Q i M    
  ( 2) , 3,4....iR i Nq q i M    
and all decision variables must be non-negative integers. 
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of welfare when Firm 1 using a requirements tie-in strategy has 
an opportunity to extract value from returned EOL durable printers by remanufacturing.  
Cost savings from remanufacturing determine if Firm 1 can return to QT printer 
production.  Environmental savings from remanufacturing determine how far SMC can be 
reduced in printer market. 
 
Notice in this formulation the firm will always choose to remanufacture all 
returned products even when there is no cost savings from remanufacturing (i.e., s=0).   
When the savings are positive (s>0), remanufacturing is clearly more profitable than new 
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production.  But when s=0 the firm still benefits by not having to pay to recycle returned 
durable product that could be remanufactured.  So then the third constraint becomes 
( 2) , 3,4....iR i Nq q i M  .  But K is maximized when QT printers are brought to the market 
in each period.  Hence the firm is motivated to pursue remanufacturing to reduce its cost 
of complying with the take-back requirement in order to be able to produce QT printers in 
each period. 
The social planner’s problem will take into account producer surplus described 
above, along with consumer surplus and environmental damage.  Although determining 
environmental impact can be challenging, we estimate total environmental impact by 
considering energy usage over the durable product’s life cycle.  Environmental damage is 
then estimated by multiplying environmental impact by an environmental cost per unit of 
energy.   In calculating environmental impact in this way, it is necessary to know the 
cumulative energy demand (CED) for different life stages and the EOL treatment for the 
durable product as defined in Table 4.2.   
Table 4.2 Environmental impact parameters 
Symbol Definition 
eN Energy required to manufacture a durable product 
eu Durable product use phase energy 
ed Energy required for durable product disposal 
er Energy required for durable product recycling 
eR Energy required to remanufacture a durable product 
ce Environmental cost per mega joule (MJ) of energy 
 
The environmental damage associated with a durable product market (and tied 
market for use phase impact) is dependent upon the take-back mandate.  Without a take-
back requirement (and no durable product remanufacturing), durable products are simply 
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routed to disposal when consumers discard the product.  Under the collective take-back 
scheme discarded durable products will be routed to recycling as opposed to disposal.  
For both schemes, we assume all discarded products are collected and ultimately 
recycled, but in reality take-back legislation may have collection and recycling targets 
less than 100%.  For the individual take-back requirement, we investigate the case where 
discarded products can be remanufactured for another useful life and then ultimately 
recycled after seeing a second use cycle.  Environmental damage for these three scenarios 
is shown in Table 4.3.  If r de e then the collective scheme will result in less 
environmental damage; typically ed will be positive and er will be negative.     
Table 4.3: Environmental damage representation for each take-back scenario  
Take-back requirement Environmental Damage (ED) 
None 
1
( )( )
M
e N u d iN
i
c e e e q

    
Collective  
1
( )( )
M
e N u r iN
i
c e e e q

    
Individual 
1 1 1
[( )( ) ( )( ) ( ( ))]
M M M
e N u iN R u r iR r iN iR
i i i
c e e q e e e q e q q
  
         
 
The social planner’s problem is to maximize the sum of producer surplus (PS) and 
consumer surplus (CS), less environmental damage (ED).  If there are n firms producing 
durable products using a requirements tie-in strategy in a product market, then the social 
planner’s problem becomes: 
{ , }
1
max
iN iR
n
i
q q
i
SW PS CS ED

    
Under the collective scheme, the social planner tries to balance reductions in PS 
and CS from fewer durables brought to the market with the decreased environmental 
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damage from fewer durables and with environmental gains from EOL handling 
(recycling instead of landfill).  When ce and (ed -er) are very large, the collective scheme 
may be preferred to no take-back requirement.  In the individual scheme, the social 
planner tries to balance increases in PS and CS from more durables brought to the market 
with the lower environmental damage per durable achieved by remanufacturing 
(assuming eR<eN) and recycling when durable reuse becomes impractical.  In the 
individual scheme, the quantity of durable product released to the market depends on the 
cost savings each firm can obtain from remanufacturing operations.  Whereas 
environmental damage per durable produced depends upon the realized environmental 
savings achieved from the specific remanufacturing operations of each firm. 
In examining the firm’s problem under either collective take-back (Eq. (4.2)) or 
individual take-back (Eq. 4.3)), as long as cr is not set at a level that prohibits the firm 
from making positive profit, the introduction of this term into Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) is not 
sufficient to force the firm to abandon a tie-in sales strategy. 
 But if we focus on Firm 1 using requirements tie-in strategy, three questions come 
to mind:  
1. What level of cost savings from remanufacturing enables Firm 1 to maximize 
profit by bringing the maximum amount of printers (QT) to the market in each 
period?  
2. What level of environmental savings per printer from remanufacturing must be 
realized such that SMC=PMC at QT printer production? 
3. How far could SMC be lowered based on environmental savings achieved from 
remanufacturing? 
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These three questions will be examined in the next sections. 
4.3 Model simulation 
In this section, we introduce additional assumptions so that we can (a) simulate 
how the markets in Section 4.2 operate from both private and social perspectives and (b) 
illustrate how the product take-back requirement for the durable product (printer) may 
enable the firm to lower its cost of producing the durable tying product through 
remanufacturing and restore its profit while reducing environmental damage.  Note that 
our version of a remanufactured product consist of both virgin and remanufactured 
components obtained from returned EOL printers used in the production of printers with 
newly introduced model numbers.  This latter version would make the most sense for a 
firm employing tying.   
Printers, like most information and communications technology (ICT), undergo 
rapid obsolescence.  But components and modules within a printer (such as print media 
transport) rarely change.  Typically, new features such as WI-FI capability are added to 
printer models just as new features are added to other ICT devices over time (e.g., 
cellular phones becoming smart phones).  Under these market conditions, a firm forced to 
take-back unwanted durable printers, would best be served to reclaim the durable aspects 
of the printer components that can be reused in a new printer model that is paired with a 
new cartridge model.   
In so doing, a firm is able to “lock-in” a new set of customers to a tied 
arrangement.  Even though components from durable products may undergo several 
remanufacturing cycles, we assume that components retrieved from an EOL printer 
undergo just one remanufacturing cycle to maintain simplicity. Table 4.4 lists parameter 
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definitions and values used for the numerical example.  We use total energy consumption 
to represent the environmental impact for activities used in Table 4.4 taken from Table 20 
of a comprehensive study investigating imaging equipment in the European market [73].  
The Stobbe report assumed an inkjet printer was used for 4 years with an annual output of 
1,040 printed (A4) pages.  Even though research suggests remanufacturing may 
theoretically achieve 85-90% energy savings compared to virgin production, many 
factors come into play in order to determine actual energy savings from remanufacturing 
that may be achieved by a firm [74].  Hence, we will look at a range of environmental 
savings from remanufacturing. 
Table 4.4 Parameter values for numerical example 
Activity Damage 
Estimate (MJ) 
Firm Cost 
Estimate ($) 
Printer Production 
(Virgin) 
1437 10 
Usage* 1614 2.50 
Printer Recycling -275 5 
Printer Disposal 344 N/A 
Printer Remanufacturing various various 
*environmental damage includes electricity, paper and five cartridges, and firm cost 
reflects five cartridges with a cost of $0.50 each. 
 
Following Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we assume the demand for printers is represented by 
PP=100-QP and marginal revenue (MR) by PP=100-2QP, where PP is the price of a 
printer and QP is the quantity of printers.  We also assume the following demand and 
marginal revenue functions for the cartridge market as shown in Table 4.5, where PC is 
the price of a cartridge and QC is the quantity of cartridges. 
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Table 4.5 Cartridge demand and marginal revenue  
Case Cartridge Demand Cartridge Marginal Revenue 
Monopoly 50
50
300
C CP Q   
50
50
150
C CP Q   
Tying,  
No Take-back 
140
140
900
C CP Q   
140
140
500
C CP Q   
Tying, Collective  
Take-back 
100
100
650
C CP Q   
100
100
350
C CP Q   
 
If Firm 1 is a monopolist serving the printer market and Firm 2 is a monopolist 
serving the cartridge market, then each firm would set production such that marginal 
revenue was equal to marginal cost (MR=MC).  Firm 1 would produce 45 printers that 
sell for $55 each, providing Firm 1 a profit of $2,025.  Firm 2 would produce 148 
cartridges that sell for $25.33, providing Firm 2 a profit of approximately $3,675, 
assuming its cost to produce a cartridge is $0.50.  If Firm 1 is able to use a requirements 
tie-in strategy and drive Firm 2 out of the cartridge market, Firm 1 would make no profit 
in the printer market and bring 90 printers to the market per period.  Under tying, QC 
would be 450 cartridges ((90 printers)*(5 cartridges per printer)).  Substituting 450 
cartridges into the demand function for cartridges under tying, we get PC = $70.  So then 
the total profit per period for Firm 1 under tying is (450)*($70)-(0.50)*(450) = $31,275.   
Suppose the policymaker institutes a product take-back requirement in the printer 
market that is implemented as the collective scheme.  A collective product take-back 
would divert discarded printers from the municipal waste stream and make the 
manufacturer responsible for the cost of recycling discarded printers.  If the cost of 
recycling printers is equal to the social marginal cost less the private marginal cost (SMC-
    
 
100 
PMC), then the collective take-back requirement acts like a Pigouvian tax.  In response to 
the collective take-back requirement, Firm 1’s private marginal cost would become the 
same as the social marginal cost, namely $15 in our example.  Firm 1 would decrease its 
production of printers from 90 to 85 printers per period, and the reduced level of printers 
would shift the demand for cartridges inward per Table 4.5.  Firm 1 would still earn zero 
profit in the printer market, but now its profit in the cartridge market becomes 
(425)*($34.62)-(0.50)*(425) = $14,501. 
But now let’s consider if the product take-back requirement is implemented as an 
individual scheme, enabling Firm 1 to extract value from returned printers discarded by 
consumers.  What cost savings from remanufacturing must be attained to enable Firm 1 
to return to its previous profitability level prior to the durable product take-back 
requirement?  In order to answer this question, we refer to Table 4.6 that shows 10 
periods of Firm 1’s activity when it can remanufacture its durable printers which last two 
periods, one time as indicated in maximization problem Eq. (4.3).  Setting revenue equal 
to costs and solving for RC (per printer remanufacturing cost), we get RC=$2.5.  Hence, 
if Firm 1 is able to achieve a remanufacturing cost of $2.5 per printer, Firm 1 can restore 
its profit level it had prior to the take-back requirement.  Cost savings from 
remanufacturing discarded printers allow the firm to cover the cost of recycling printers 
that can no longer be remanufactured  and ensure no printers are routed to the waste 
stream.    Prior to the product take-back mandate, unwanted printers were just routed to 
the municipal waste stream since the product tying strategy of low durable pricing 
discourage the development of a secondhand market for the durable products.   
Essentially, the take-back requirement may benefit a firm that can reuse EOL product to 
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lower production costs by more than product collection costs [6].   Table 4.7 summarizes 
the economic welfare performance for each take-back scenario.  
 
Table 4.6 Firm production under durable product take-back with remanufacturing 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Virgin 90 90 - - 90 90 - - 90 90 
Returned - - 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
EOL - - - - 90 90 - - 90 90 
Remanufactured - - 90 90 -  90 90 - - 
Revenue ($) 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
Virgin 
Production  
Costs ($) 
900 900 - - 900 900 - - 900 900 
Remanufacturing 
Costs ($) 
- - 90RC 90RC - - 90RC 90RC - - 
Recycling  
Costs ($) 
- -   450 450   900 900 
 
Table 4.7 Economic welfare for each product take-back scenario 
Scenario Market Profit Consumer 
Surplus 
Economic 
Welfare 
No Take-back  
Printer - $4,050 
$51,075 
Cartridge $31,275 $15,750 
Collective Take-back 
Printer - $3,612.5 
$32,007 
Cartridge $14,501 $13,893.25 
Individual Take-back 
with Remanufacturing* 
Printer - $4,050 
$51,075 
Cartridge $31,275 $15,750 
*when cost to remanufacture is $2.5 per printer 
However, as stated previously, remanufacturing often yields environmental 
savings.  In Chapter 2 we learned that remanufacturing of inkjet cartridges provided 
environmental savings of 20% to 60% based on variability in spent cartridge travel 
distance, spent cartridge quality and remanufacturer efficiency.  Using the values listed in 
Table 4.4, we can calculate environmental damage as shown in Table 4.8.  The collective 
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product take-back scheme has the desired effect of reducing environmental damage in 
two ways.  First, discarded EOL printers are diverted from the waste stream and get 
recycled, providing an energy credit.  Second, shifting landfill costs associated with EOL 
printers to the printer manufacturer and requiring the printer firm to incur recycling costs 
forces the printer firm to reduce the number of printers brought to the market, in turn 
reducing consumption of ink cartridges.  The individual product take-back scheme that 
has the printer firm initiating environmentally desirable remanufacturing operations 
enabled by the product take-back law, leads to a further reduction in environmental 
damage than the collective scheme, when remanufacturing provides an environmental 
savings (eN -eR) of 50% compared to virgin printer production.  Environmental harm per 
printer in the printer market is decreased due to the environmental benefits from 
remanufacturing.   
 
Table 4.8 Environmental damage for each product take-back scenario 
 Scenario Printer 
Production 
(MJ) 
Cartridge 
Consumption 
(MJ) 
Printer 
EOL 
(MJ) 
Total 
Damage 
(MJ) 
Damage 
per 
Printer 
(MJ) 
No Printer 
Take-back 
90*1437 90*1614 90*344 305,550 3395 
Collective 
Take-back 
85*1437 85*1614 85*(-275) 235,960 2776 
Individual 
Take-back* 
(54*1437) + 
(36*719) 
90*1614 54*(-275) 233,892 2598.8 
*when remanufacturing provides a 50% environmental savings using data from Table 4.4 
Stobbe estimated that the average installed base for inkjet printers in the EU-25 
countries was 105,614,549 units [73] in 2010.  If the environmental damage of each 
printer including usage is 3,395 MJ, then the calculated environmental damage is 8.57 
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Mtoe (Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent).  According to the International Energy Agency 
[75], the entire energy consumption for the EU-25 in 2009 was approximately 1200 
Mtoe.  Although energy consumption related to inkjet printers is only 0.7% of total 
energy consumption, considering an inkjet printer represents just one of many products 
consumed in EU-25 countries, this finding is far from trivial.  If we extrapolate our 
findings from our numerical example and consider the impacts of a take-back law 
(individual versus collective) for the estimated 25,056,622 printer placements for 2010, 
we would have the results shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 Environmental damage calculations using printer placements in 2010 for EU-
25 for each product take-back scenario when remanufacturing provides a 50% 
environmental savings compared to virgin printer production 
Scenario Printer  
Production 
(MJ) 
Cartridge 
Consumption 
(MJ) 
Printer EOL 
Treatment (MJ) 
Total 
Damage 
(MJ) 
Damage 
per 
Printer 
(MJ) 
No Printer 
Take-back 
25,056,622*1437 
=3.6x10
10
 
25,056,622*1614 
=4.0x10
10
 
25,056,622*344 
=8.62x10
9
 
8.56x10
10
 3395 
Collective 
Take-back 
23,664,587*1437 
=3.4x10
10
 
 
23,664,587*1614 
=3.82x10
10
 
23,664,587*(-275) 
= -6.51x10
9
 
6.57x10
10
 2776 
Individual 
Take-back 
30,819,645* 
[(0.6*1437) + 
(0.4*719)] 
=3.54x10
10
 
30,819,645*1614 
=4.97x10
10
 
18,491,787*(-275) 
= -5.08x10
9
 
8.01x10
10
 2598.8 
 
From Table 4.9, we can see the economic and environmental trade-offs are quite 
different depending on which take-back scheme is implemented.  In the collective 
scheme, energy associated with printer production and use is reduced by 1.99 x10
10
 MJ, 
but 1,392,035 printer placements that are desired by consumers do not occur because the 
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producers reduce printer output as a consequence of absorbing EOL collection and 
recycling costs.   Whereas, in the individual take-back scheme with remanufacturing, 
energy associated with printer production and use is reduced by 0.55x10
10
 MJ, while 
servicing the same number of consumers as when there is not a take-back requirement.  
The difference in the number of printer placements is easy to envision, but it may not be 
so apparent for energy differences without a frame of reference.  To bring some 
perspective regarding energy, the United States Energy Information Administration [76] 
estimated that the average annual electricity consumption for a U.S. residential utility 
customer was 11,496 kWh (41,385.6 MJ) in 2010.  Using this value, the collective take-
back scheme would save the energy consumed by 480,843 U.S. homes, and the 
individual take-back scheme would save the energy consumed by 132,896 U.S. homes 
annually. 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
The previous section was based on the assumption that remanufacturing provided 
a 50% environmental savings compared to virgin production for the durable product 
(printer).  Although this assumption is within reason [39, 74], broadening this assumption 
allows us to explore boundary conditions and determine if our general results still hold.  
Specifically, increasing environmental savings from remanufacturing allows us to explore 
how low SMC can become in the printer market.   
 From Table 4.4 we see that the majority of the environmental damage in our case 
study comes from the durable production and disposal phases (1781 MJ) compared to the 
use phase (1614 MJ) prior to a take-back requirement.  However, under either durable 
take-back scheme that ultimately requires discarded durable products be recycled, the use 
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phase now becomes the dominant contributor of environment damage (1614 MJ vs. 1162 
MJ).  Using the formulas for environmental damage for each take-back scenario from 
Table 4.3, and using a modest value for ce of $0.01, we can calculate social welfare for 
each take scenario as shown in Table 4.10.  
Table 4.10 Economic and environmental performance for each take-back scenario, 
showing social welfare range based upon environmental savings from remanufacturing 
under individual take-back 
Scenario Economic 
Welfare 
Environmental 
Damage 
(ce=$0.01) 
Social 
Welfare 
No Take-back  
$51,075 $3,055 $48,020 
Collective Take-back 
$32,007 $2,360 $29,647 
Individual Take-back 
with Remanufacturing 
Providing No 
Environmental Savings 
$51,075 $2,597 $48,478 
Individual Take-back 
with Remanufacturing 
Providing 50% 
Environmental Savings 
$51,075 $2,339 $48,736 
Individual Take-back 
with Remanufacturing 
Providing 90% 
Environmental Savings 
$51,075 $2,132 $48,943 
 
 Notice that there is an increase in social welfare under individual take-back versus 
the no take-back scenario even when remanufacturing provides no environmental 
savings.  This occurs because the durable product take-back law requires discarded 
product be (eventually) routed to environmentally preferred EOL fates (e.g., recycling) 
with lower environmental damage compared to disposal (e.g., landfill) as is the case 
when no take-back law is in place.   
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4.5 Conclusion and directions for future research 
This paper examined the social welfare effects of an extended producer 
responsibility (EPR) product take-back requirement for a durable product when a firm 
uses a requirement tie-in sales strategy.  We found that the economic and environmental 
trade-offs were dependent upon whether the durable product take-back was implemented 
with a collective scheme (promoting recycling of durables) or an individual scheme 
(enabling each producer to determine how best to use returned EOL durables).  For the 
latter implementation, we specifically considered what would happen if the durable 
producer implemented remanufacturing operations, often touted as being preferred over 
recycling from an environmental perspective.  We found that the collective scheme 
reduced environmental damage, but also produced the lowest welfare of the alternatives.  
The individual scheme with remanufacturing (assuming remanufacturing offered an 
environmental benefit) resulted in reductions in environmental damage that varied based 
upon environmental savings achieved from remanufacturing, while increasing welfare. 
These findings are worth further exploration.   
If policymakers intended for the product take-back law to reduce environmental 
damage in the durable product market, then the collective take-back scheme gives this 
result, but also reduces welfare from fewer durables (printers) brought to the market.  
Whereas, if policymakers intended for the product take-back law to reduce environmental 
damage on a per durable product (printer) basis, we see individual take-back can meet 
this objective when the firm implements remanufacturing while welfare increases.  Since 
consumers realize benefit from using durables (printers), the consumer surplus gains are 
predominantly seen in the tied consumables market.  Of course, these findings assume 
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that consumer demand remains unchanged and producers are not influenced by the 
product take-back law other than the producer implementing remanufacturing operations 
or incurring recycling costs. But, it seems unlikely that a firm forced to comply with a 
collective take-back law would not respond to try to maintain or exploit an opportunity to 
increase its profits.  It is not possible to envision all these responses, and subsequent 
reactions of competing firms and consumers.  However, one such producer response may 
be for the producer to raise the price of ink cartridges to try to recoup recycling costs 
incurred in the printer market from collective take-back.  Although this may result in 
consumers printing less, let’s assume the printer producer is clever in disguising the price 
increase of ink cartridges by launching a lower yield (and lower priced) ink cartridge.  A 
lower yield cartridge that effectively raises the price of ink, may lead to an increase in 
environmental harm even if consumers respond as expected and purchase fewer ink 
cartridges.  How could this be?  A reduction in ink per cartridge will result in an increase 
in environmental impact on a printed page basis [77].  The net change to environmental 
impact in the consumables market will increase if the per page impact contribution 
exceeds the reduction in environmental impact from printing less.  If consumers purchase 
cartridges one at a time, lower yield ink cartridges may lead to more environmental harm 
from an increase in driving trips to the store by consumers to purchase cartridges holding 
printed output constant as demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
It is clear that the introduction of a take-back law, regardless of whether it is 
collective or individual, will result in changes to the system dynamics of the durable and 
tied consumables markets when a requirements tie-in strategy is in place.  What is 
unclear is whether the resulting system spanning these two product markets will lead to a 
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net gain or net loss to welfare and environmental impact metrics over the long run.    This 
paper considered only the likely responses of reducing durable output by a producer in 
the collective take-back scheme, and reuse of returned durable product by a producer 
under the individual take-back scheme.   Under these terms, we demonstrate that 
individual take-back with the tying monopolist remanufacturing can restore economic 
efficiency and provide environmental benefits, resulting in a net increase in social 
welfare.  Future work could use real world data to examine markets prior to any take-
back legislation with markets that use a collective scheme and markets with an individual 
scheme to see how producer and consumer responses to take-back beyond those analyzed 
here, have affected economic and environmental performance. 
We presented a framework to include the cost of environmental damage in 
calculating social welfare, but we did not delve into what the cost to the environment per 
unit of energy should be.  Further research could estimate this value for different products 
and different circumstances.  When the cost to the environment is low and environmental 
savings from remanufacturing are low, then maybe the social planner would opt to 
recommend a collective scheme.  But for products where the cost to the environment is 
relatively high and environmental savings from remanufacturing are high, the social 
planner may pursue an individual take-back scheme. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation emphasized the importance of using a product system structure 
to describe the interaction dynamics amongst actors with a product market in order to 
project the economic and environmental effects of an intervention anticipated to provide 
environmental improvement.  Specifically, in Chapter 2 we demonstrated that there are 
opportunities to provide environmental improvement in how consumers go about 
purchasing products without affecting the quantity or type of product purchased.  
Information that results from scientific analysis is an intervention that maintains the 
product system structure, without inducing government or producers to respond in a 
manner that may undo environmental gains. 
Chapter 3 explored the opportunity for government to fine tune the existing 
intellectual property rights (IPR) system to encourage firms to reduce physical attributes 
introduced in products to deter independent firms from remanufacturing the OM’s 
product in exchange for more intellectual property right protection.  In particular, we 
show that it is possible for the firm to maintain profitability, while social welfare 
increases from more remanufacturing.   Chapter 4 examines the case where a new policy, 
durable product take-back, can have a wide range of economic and environmental effects 
across both durable and tied consumable markets.  In the case study we examined, the 
individual responsibility scheme enables the OMs to salvage value from durable printers 
that they were not able to recover prior to the take-back requirement.  We show that cost 
savings and environmental savings that can be achieved from remanufacturing can enable 
a firm using product tying to maintain profitability levels prior to the take-back 
requirement, and improve social welfare.  Social welfare gains occur from reductions in 
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environmental damage in two ways, (1) remanufacturing reduces virgin production and 
(2) the take-back law ensures EOL durable products are recycled versus landfilled when 
there is not a take-back law.  
This dissertation stressed the importance of ensuring modelers have an awareness 
of the interaction dynamics amongst actors within a product system so that any 
intervention attempt aimed at providing a desired effect (such as environmental 
improvement) can be evaluated, while identifying possible unanticipated effects.  A 
general framework is proposed and demonstrated to provide guidance in this regard, but 
there are many opportunities to improve the approach.  The framework does not specify 
how to determine and classify interactions amongst actors, nor does it identify which 
interactions to include in the model and which to ignore.  Similarly, the framework does 
not specify which product markets to consider in a product system structure in order to 
identify how an intervention in one product market may impact another product market.  
These judgments are left to the modeler, and each decision should be justified from real-
world observations, market data and relevant literature.  Future work could include 
criteria in the proposed modeling framework to help modelers make these decisions.  
Although the inclusion of both printer and cartridge markets proved to add complexity to 
the analysis, the tie-in sales strategy in use dictated that both markets needed to be 
included in our product system structure.    
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Appendix: Previous LCA Literature for Print Cartridges 
A LCA study of a Hewlett-Packard inkjet cartridge conducted by Pollock and 
Coulon in 1996 provided an environmental impact baseline across five life cycle stages 
identified as Print head Manufacturing, Final Assembly, Distribution, Use and End-Of-
Life (EOL)[12].  The functional unit chosen for the study was 100 monochrome single-
sided printed pages, which represented approximately 15% of the cartridge expected page 
yield.  The results of the study were used by Hewlett-Packard to prioritize and evaluate 
alternatives the company could take to reduce the environmental impact of an inkjet 
cartridge.  Their baseline results indicated that 85% of the environmental impact of an 
inkjet cartridge was associated with the Production stage for Global Warming Potential 
(GWP) as seen in Table 2.1. The Production stage in the Pollock and Coulon study is the 
sum of two life cycle stages; Print head Manufacturing representing 41% GWP impact 
and the Final Assembly stage representing 44% GWP impact.  The Distribution stage 
contributed 13% GWP impact, followed by the EOL stage with 2% GWP impact, which 
assumed the inkjet cartridge was routed to a landfill and incineration with some energy 
recovery.  Interestingly, the Use phase represented a negligible impact (0% GWP) since 
Pollock and Coulon only considered the energy used by the printer in printing the 
functional unit and did not include the impact of paper. Under these assumptions, “usage 
impacts due to printing energy were found to be very small and are not shown in Fig. 3” 
[12].  Actual values were not given for GWP by life cycle stage in the Pollock and 
Coulon study, the percentages presented in Table 2.1 are extracted from Pollock and 
Coulon’s Figure 3 [12].  Pollock and Coulon considered the impact of paper and 
electricity consumed while the printer was idle over a one week period of time and 
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compared the impacts to the baseline inkjet life cycle impact.  They found the impact of 
paper represented approximately 21.5 times the total inkjet baseline GWP impact and 
printer electricity consumed over one week represented approximately 2.25 times the 
total inkjet baseline GWP impact.  
In a 2002 laser cartridge LCA, Berglind and Eriksson considered three new HP 
C4127X cartridges versus one new HP C4127X cartridge with two remanufacturing 
cycles[13].  Their study assumed the quality of a remanufactured cartridge was the same 
as a new one, in both page yield and printed output quality.   Paper used during a use 
cycle was 10,000 A4 pages with 5% coverage for both a new cartridge use stage and a 
remanufactured cartridge use stage.  Their study presented comparative results with and 
without paper, but did not break the results down by life cycle stages.  Remanufacturing 
outperformed new cartridges by approximately 13% in Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
(93.1 kg CO2e for new vs. 82.1 kg CO2e remanufactured) considering paper impacts and 
63% reduction (28.6 kg CO2e for new vs. 17.6 kg CO2e remanufactured) without 
considering the impacts of paper. The environmental impact of paper was responsible for 
41.5% of the energy consumed for three new cartridges and 50% of the energy consumed 
for the remanufactured case.  Table 2.1 reflects these impacts normalized to one life cycle 
to be consistent with other studies.  This study considered idle and standby energy 
consumed by the printer over the estimated four month use stage within a cartridge life 
cycle in Europe.  Interestingly, the electricity required to print 10,000 pages for one 
cartridge life cycle required less than 5% (4.9%) of the electricity consumed during the 
use stage, indicating that idle and standby electricity consumed by the printer over the 
expected cartridge use cycle duration is significant. 
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Table A.1 Cartridge performance factors considered in determining use phase impacts in 
First Environment Inc.[14] LCA study 
 HP C4096A Rem-Baseline Rem - Drill & Fill Rem -Int'l Oper. 
Observed Page Yield 2,960 2,741 2,283 2,428 
Usable Pages 2,387 2,490 1,878 2,285 
Unusable Pages 123 251 405 143 
 
 
In 2004, First Environment issued a report of their findings of a comparative LCA 
study where one HP C4096A (“96A”) cartridge was compared with three scenarios of an 
HP 96A remanufactured cartridge [14].   The three scenarios considered were 1) a 
baseline remanufacturing cycle assumed to be representative of the remanufacturing 
industry in North America, 2) an international remanufactured cartridge with improved 
quality and reliability than the baseline version, and 3) a “drill and fill” operation where 
an empty OEM cartridge is just drilled in order to remove residual and waste toner in the 
cartridge and then filled with replacement toner.  The functional unit for this study was 
100 “usable” single-sided monochrome pages printed even though the cartridge has a 
rated yield of 5,000 pages.  A usable page is defined as one which “may have a minor 
flaw such as a speck or uneven graphic rendering but the average user would still use it in 
a typical business document” or “has no apparent artefacts with the identifying rule of 
thumb being that a user would put this page in his or her resume” as defined in a 2003 
study conducted by Quality Logic [14, 78].    
The introduction of the adjective “usable” in the functional unit definition is an 
attempt to capture differences in performance across the cartridge scenarios considered.  
The authors argue that in order to accomplish a fair comparison across each cartridge 
scenario, the performance of a cartridge must be taken into account.  In this study, 
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performance is represented by two dimensions, quantity of pages printed and quality of 
pages printed.  Quantity of pages printed pertains to the number of pages printed (i.e. 
page yield) and quality is a subjective measurement (i.e. usability) of each page printed.  
However, the incorporation of these measures into the use stage affects paper usage, and 
since paper is the largest contributor to life cycle environmental impact; these factors 
strongly influence cartridge comparison results. 
Page yield used in this study is based upon results reported in the 2003 Quality 
Logic study, where page yield is determined by averaging the observed page yield for 
each cartridge scenario [78].  Remanufactured cartridges will have different toner 
properties than new OEM cartridges and variations in the amount of toner supplied by 
each producer; both factors will affect the rated yield (i.e. the expected number of pages 
printed at 5% toner coverage) of the cartridge.  The average observed page yield measure 
effectively captures higher yield opportunities from remanufactured cartridges as well as 
cartridge reliability.  Premature cartridge failure will reduce the number of pages printed 
for the sample, and thus reduce the average observed pages printed.  Table A.1 
summarizes the average observed page yield, unusable pages and usable pages printed for 
each cartridge scenario considered in the 2004 LCA comparison study [14].  In the 2003 
Quality Logic performance study, some remanufactured cartridges prematurely failed 
while none of the 50 new OEM cartridges prematurely failed.   
  The use stage GWP impact value by cartridge scenario from Table 1 correlates 
with the number of unusable pages printed in Table A.1.  That is, as the number of 
unusable pages printed by cartridge type increases so does GWP impact associated with 
the use stage of the cartridge life cycle.  In this study, the results were highly sensitive to 
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cartridge performance.  Environmental impact savings attributed to remanufacturing 
would be undercut by increased impacts during a remanufactured cartridge’s use stage if 
the remanufactured cartridge prematurely failed, or had a large ratio of unusable to usable 
pages printed compare with a new OEM cartridge.  This study also just considered the 
energy required by the printer to print 100 usable pages, whereas Berglind and Ericksson 
(2002) considered idle and standby power of the printer over the typical four month 
timeframe the cartridge was used which represented more than 95% of the electricity 
consumed during the use stage.  Another interesting result from this study pertains to the 
environmental impact associated with EOL treatment.  In the OEM case, the assumption 
that the metals within the cartridge are recycled and the balance of the materials go to 
waste-to-energy represent a 20% credit in environmental impact, whereas EOL 
treatments for the three remanufactured versions provide a modest credit ranging from 
1% to 8% of the life cycle. 
In 2008, Four Elements Consulting, LLC issued a refreshed version of the 2004 
study performed by First Environment, Inc., but used updated assumptions consistent 
with the European cartridge market[14].  However, as opposed to considering three 
different remanufactured cartridge alternatives, this study considered one baseline 
remanufactured alternative, with sensitivity analysis on component replacement rate, 
transportation distance, percentage of cartridges collected that are unsuitable for 
remanufacturing, distribution distance, number of pages printed, and EOL treatment.  
Similar to the 2004 study results, the use stage dominated the environmental impact, and 
represented 90% of the environmental impact in GWP for an OEM cartridge and 96% of 
the environmental impact in GWP for the remanufactured cartridge as seen in Table 1.  
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The use phase for a remanufactured cartridge contributed 0.835 kg CO2 eq compared 
with 0.72 kg CO2 eq for a new OEM cartridge.  The reason for this difference is 
attributed to the number of pages printed during the use cycle to achieve the functional 
unit of 100 usable pages.  The new OEM cartridge required 101 pages printed, while the 
remanufactured cartridge required 117 pages printed to achieve 100 usable pages. 
In 2011, Gutowski et al considered the energy savings that may be achieved from 
remanufacturing for a variety of products, including laser cartridges [8].  In this article, 
the authors used the 2008 Four Elements Consulting, LLC study as the primary basis for 
their analysis, but made two assumptions in favor of remanufacturing.  The two 
assumptions were: 1) end-of-life (EOL) treatment for a remanufactured laser cartridge 
was the same as EOL treatment for a new cartridge returned to the OEM after end-of-
first-life (EOFL), and 2) the remanufactured cartridge performed as a new OEM 
cartridge.  Gutowski et al determined that under these assumptions, a remanufactured 
laser cartridge would provide a 6% energy savings compared to a new OEM cartridge. 
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